In order to stimulate discussion of past nuclear crises and current nuclear risks, the Global Security Institute hosted a screening of Thirteen Days, the critically acclaimed film about the Cuban Missile Crisis, on March 7 at the United Nations. Participants included over 225 ambassadors and mission representatives from dozens of countries and many NGO representatives.
Preceding and following the film, Jonathan Granoff of GSI hosted conversations with Ambassador Richard Butler (former head of the Iraq weapons inspection team), Theodore C. Sorensen (Special Adviser to President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis), Jayantha Dhanapala (U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs), and Peter Almond (producer of Thirteen Days). The panel was co-hosted by Lawyers Alliance for World Security and the American Bar Association.
Commenting that Thirteen Days was a remarkable historic reenactment which reminded generations of that critical time when we almost faced a nuclear holocaust, Ambassador Dhanapala voiced his concern that the theory of deterrence can be neither proved nor disproved, since a single failure of nuclear deterrence would be catastrophic.
“The only weapons of mass destruction that we have not de-legitimized are the nuclear weapons. This will take leadership on the part of the countries that have nuclear weapons. Civil society must take action to eliminate nuclear weapons, to strengthen the political will so we do not have to wait for another crisis or for another accidental nuclear war to realize their destructive potential. The international community can solve their problems through peaceful, political means rather than using weapons of war, which is a very uncivilized and barbaric way to settle problems, particularly in the 21st century.”
In the pre-screening interview, Ambassador Richard Butler noted that the nuclear danger has not gone away with the end of the Cold War: “The nuclear age began with two nuclear weapons, the two that the United States used over Japan. In the subsequent 30 years no less than 80,000 nuclear weapons were created and even though the Cold War is behind us, many of the strategic nuclear weapons are still on hair trigger alert status. It is a matter of minutes that a retaliatory launch of nuclear weapons may be authorized.”
After the screening, Mr. Sorensen recounted the climate, personalities, perceptions, fears and factors that contributed to the tensions and decisions made at that time. He emphasized the importance of having thirteen days to respond: “If we had been required to make an immediate response, we would have bombed those missiles. We now know that the local Soviet commanders in Cuba had full authority to use those tactical weapons if there was any attack on Cuba by the United States. We would have responded, almost surely, to a nuclear attack with a nuclear counter attack. We wouldnt probably be sitting here talking about this movie tonight.”
“There are a great many lessons from those thirteen days that are relevant today. Most important is the quality of leadership, in the U.S. and in other countries. It is also important that adversaries keep lines of communication open, keep the dialogue going and try to find some way other than armed hostilities to solve critical situations.”
Mr. Sorensen emphasized the importance of multilateral organizations, such as the support given by the OAS and Allies in Europe, and stressed the critical role of the United Nations in providing a forum for patience and restraint.
In response to a question about the diplomatic implications of NMD, Mr. Sorensen said that national missile defense was a contradiction of terms. “What would be the real value, to say nothing of the consequences, of the United States having a true shield that somehow protected the United States but protected no one else in the world? It would destroy alliances of cooperation, confidence in our restraint and our willingness to share their pain. The word “defense” in that trio is a misnomer. No system has been invented which can provide an absolute defense. The offense would always get ahead of defense, no matter how thoroughly a defense was developed. The United States is relatively free from the threat of destruction today. But I am willing to wager that in a list of the 15 most likely means of a destructive attack upon the U.S., nuclear missiles, flying through space would rank number 15 at best.”
Ambassador Dhanapala and Jonathan Granoff discussed the feasibility and implications of the proposed defense shield. Ambassador Dhanapala remarked, “A missile defense program undermines the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty and opens a Pandoras box to another arms race, at a time when 182 countries are seeking full compliance to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was also signed by the five nuclear powers.”
At the close of the evening, Jonathan Granoff reflected, “Hitler had to drag 6 million people to the ovens. We have now put wings on the ovens. As we speak those ovens are ready to deliver their horrific payload. Thirteen Days is a renewed wake-up call. The combination of human fallibility and technological prowess compels me to say it is time that we reign in these weapons through the constraints of morality, law, and human cooperation. I hope that all of you who watch the movie Thirteen Days will join us in working to achieve that goal.”
Posted by zack_allen
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Interview with Theodore Sorensen About Thirteen Days
GRANOFF: We are privileged to have with us today Theodore C. Sorensen who was one of the key participants in helping to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.
For eleven years, Mr. Sorensen served as a key policy advisor, legal counsel and speechwriter to John F. Kennedy. He was involved in the civil-rights initiatives that came with President Kennedy, the decision to go to the moon, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Since 1966, he has been a noted attorney. He is senior counsel at the law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkend, Wharton and Garrison, where he specializes in international business transactions. He has traveled to more than 75 countries, has met with more than 50 Heads of State, and has been involved with some of the significant transactions in our process of living in a global village. He is the husband of the Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations, Gillian Sorensen.
Mr. Sorensen, when did you first hear about the missiles in Cuba? Where were you and what were your thoughts at that moment?
THEODORE SORENSEN:
The President called me in and told me that McGeorge Bundy had informed him that morning that the CIA photo intelligencers had read photos from the U2 satellite plane indicating the beginnings of Soviet nuclear missile sites in Cuba. The President said that at 11:00 that morning he would be calling together a meeting of those whose judgement he wished to advise him on how to handle this unprecedented crisis. He asked me to attend the meeting and to prepare by reviewing the statements he had made about this contingency.
GRANOFF: When did the full gravity of the Crisis hit you?
SORENSEN: The full gravity of the Crisis hit me immediately. It was solidly confirmed at the 11:00am meeting, when the intelligence briefers described the nature and range of these missiles, including Intermediate range missiles that could reach every corner of the United States, except the far Northwest, and most of Latin America as well.
GRANOFF: Was there ever a moment when you felt terrified personally?
SORENSEN: I didnt have time to feel terrified. It was thirteen days of work, service, and doing my duty. I recognized that this was an unprecedented nuclear confrontation between superpowers. There was not much time to assess blame or motive. There was no easy solution, no right solution. The Pentagon informed us that each of these missiles carried a so-called nuclear payload that was 40 times, if I recall the figure, the strength of the bombs that fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. I knew, of course, the kind of devastation that these bombs had caused.
GRANOFF: I just want to digress for a second to give everyone an idea of what that means.
A twenty megaton bomb, if dropped, would, within 1,000th of a second, create a fireball with a diameter of about two miles wide, and the epicenter would be several times hotter than the heat on the face of the sun. Within that two-mile radius the heat would be twenty million degrees Fahrenheit, vaporizing everything. Four miles out you would have winds around 650 miles per hour with 25 lbs. pressure per square inch. Six miles out metal would melt. And out to 16 miles you have heat at 1400oF and the death rate would be virtually 100%. That is just one 20-megaton device.
It is hard to conceive of this kind of power. It is hard to even conceive of them as weapons.
In terms of the way the Cuban Missile Crisis was handled, is there a moment that you are most proud of?
SORENSEN: I dont know that I am proud of the entire episode. The United States and Soviet Union brought the world to the very edge of nuclear destruction. That is nothing to be proud of.
I was proud of the leadership demonstrated by the President.
I was proud that I played some role in that. I helped to draft the speech that he addressed to the country, and that was used as our presentation to the Soviet Union, to all of our allies, and to the American people.
I had a modest role, as the movie makes clear, in the discussions of the ExCom (the Executive Committee that convened during the Crisis). I think I had something to do with the idea of ignoring the second Khrushchev letter, which was the more difficult letter, and responding instead to the first. With Robert Kennedy looking over my shoulder, I drafted for the President the reply to the Khrushchev letter, which made an agreement possible. At the Presidents instruction, I called Adlai Stevenson at the United Nations to read it over the telephone to him. Then we presented it to the ExCom. That was the letter that Robert Kennedy then carried with him to see Ambassador Dobrynin.
A slight difference from the filmit was after that letter was agreed upon that the President called a few of us into his office. It was only in that smaller group that the decision was made to unofficially convey to the Soviets, through Dobrynin, that the NATO missiles in Turkey would be removed in good time, but that they could not be removed as part of the deal.
GRANOFF: Is it true that, independently of the Crisis, the President had wanted to have the missiles removed from Turkey?
SORENSEN: Indeed. He had ordered the missiles in Turkey to be removed some months earlier. Sometimes the State Department doesnt move that rapidly.
President Kennedy had asked that those missiles in Turkey be removed. Quite frankly, this was not an arms-control measure. Polaris submarines were being moved into the Mediterraneana nuclear-powered submarine was actually a more effective weapon, but a much less provocative weapon, than a missile on the Soviets border.
GRANOFF: I am struck that the President previously had asked that the missiles in Turkey be removed. At the beginning of the Crisis did he know that they had not been removed?
SORENSEN: Im not so certain that he did. He expressed some dismay when he heard that the missiles were still there, and that Chairman Khrushchev was citing them as tit for tat, so to speak.
GRANOFF: I find this human element of decision-making based on inaccurate information to be a very interesting part of the whole story. The film stresses the point that the Joint Chiefs wanted to prevent the operability of the missiles in Cuba. Is it true that over a hundred missiles were actually operational at that time?
SORENSEN: No, there were never 100 in Cuba. But certainly a substantial percentage of the missiles were operational by that Saturday evening. The rest were to be operational within a matter of days.
We now know, which we did not know for certain then, that the nuclear warheads for those missiles had already been delivered to those sites in Cuba.
GRANOFF: Do you think that, had the President, Joint Chiefs, and ExCom known the full extent of the Cuban missile operation, more precipitous action might have been taken to eliminate them?
SORENSEN: We are very fortunate that, for a variety of reasons, we had roughly six days, of the thirteen days, to consider our action and to prepare a response.
If we had had no time at allif we had been required to make an immediate response because the Soviets knew that we knew, or because Congress, or the press, or the American public knew that we knewwe wouldnt have had time to deliberate. We wouldnt have had time to shift from the option of destroying the missiles to a more considered, more limited approach that gave Khrushchev time to reconsider.
So we would have bombed those missiles.
We now know that the missiles, to the extent that they were operational at that stage, would have been fired.
We now know that the Soviet forces in Cubaand there were more than we realizedwere equipped with tactical nuclear weapons: free range, over-ground missiles known as “frogs.”
We now know that the local Soviet commanders in Cuba had full authority to use those tactical weapons if there was any attack on Cuba by the United States.
We would have responded, almost surely, to a nuclear attack with a nuclear counter attack, and both parties would have been on a very rapid ride up the nuclear escalator. We probably wouldnt be sitting here talking about this movie tonight.
GRANOFF: We came that close?
SORENSEN: We came very close.
GRANOFF: Some people think that if it had not been for the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy would have been much less willing to question the military command and the intelligence reports. Is that true?
SORENSEN: I think the Bay of Pigs, while it was a fiascoa failed invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles, sponsored by the United Statestaught President Kennedy many lessons. One of them was that people who have a lot of brass and gray hair and who are in high military and intelligence positions are not always right. Secondly, it taught him that what are essentially political problems cannot be solved primarily by military solutions.
GRANOFF: What kind of pressures did you feel from Congress, from the military, and from the intelligence community? How much pressure did you actually feel, and how was it exerted?
SORENSEN: It is a terrible thing to say but we may have been better off because Congress was out of session during that time. The President called the congressional leaders in at the very last moment, an hour before he was to go on the air. Of course, by then our decision was set. It was just as well. Congressional leaders of both parties and both houses initially responded the same. Everybodys first reaction was: “Youve got to take some violent action. You have to hit them. You have to knock those missiles out and get rid of them.”
Indeed, one of the most intelligent, responsible leaders of the Congress, Chairman Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thought that our quarantine idea was crazy. He thought that the Soviets would respond much more negatively and fiercely if we ever shot one of their ships than if we invaded Cuba, which he thought the Soviets didnt care that much about.
GRANOFF: In the beginning of the movie, much was made of the Joint Chiefs analyzing that this deployment of missiles in Cuba constituted a change of doctrine. They saw this as indicative that the Soviets were adopting a first-use doctrine. Today, in fact, the United States, NATO and Russia currently have a first-use of nuclear weapons doctrine. Do you want to comment on that?
SORENSEN: I dont pretend to know as much about todays status as I did about the doctrine some years ago, but I would say that there were two salient factors about the Soviet move back in 1962:
1. Never before had the Soviet Union placed nuclear weapons outside their own borders. They guarded their secrecy, they guarded their security, and it was unimaginable, we thought, that the Soviets would place weapons as far away as Cuba where they could not have the same kind of control.
2. A year earlier, Khrushchev and Kennedy had begun a back-channel, secret correspondence. It was quite useful in defusing the crisis in Berlin, but unfortunately it was used by Khrushchev to deceive us, to lie to us, about what he was doing in Cuba with the offensive missiles.
That combination of factors constituted a threat, an aggressive move. I have often wondered: had Castro and Khrushchev met openly in Moscow and signed a mutual military assistance agreement, openly announcing that these weapons were going to be placed in Cuba, could the United States, in view of the NATO weapons in Turkey, have really done much about it? Im not so sure we could. But the Soviets chose a very different path, which is why we suspected the worst.
GRANOFF: I want to convey another point. Weapons are aimed first at weapons. At present, if there is a perceived missile launch by an adversary, there is about a ten-minute period before it must be confirmed.
The President of the United States then has approximately five minutes to decide what his response will be because it takes another ten minutes to use the weapons before they get hit.
There is basically a five-minute period of time in which the decision would have to be made.
This actually happened recently, in 1995. A weather satellite was launched off the coast of Norway, which Russians picked up as a perceived missile launch. The Scientific American article by Frank Von Hippel and Bruce Blair says that President Yeltsin had eight minutes to respond. Thank God that during that 8 minute period it was determined that the missile launch was not a missile aimed at Moscow, but merely a weather satellite going up to the North Pole.
I would like one or two people to look at your watch and clock off 5 minutes. We saw what could happen in thirteen days. Just imagine that, right now, all of us are living in that kind of time frame.
And I wondered: after having had that thirteen day intensive that so few people on the planet have had, what kind of wisdom could you give to us now? What do you think should be learned from that experience?
SORENSEN: I think there are a great many lessons from those thirteen days that are relevant today:
1. Most important is the quality of leadership in positions of commandin the United States or in any other countrythat might precipitate a continent or the world into war.
In this respect I pay tribute to Chairman Khrushchev who might have given the order to launch a “retaliatory” attack when our U2 plane in Asia lost navigation control and accidentally flew off course. Chairman Khrushchev might have launched an attack when he first heard that the United States was putting a naval quarantine in front of his vessels. We later learned that Chairman Khrushchev was actually shocked by the launch of the SAM missile that shot down Major Andersons U2, as we saw in the movie, because he had not given that order. He realized that events might spin out of his control as well.
2. It is important that adversaries keep a line of communication open, keep the dialogue going, and try to find some way other than armed hostilities to solve critical situations. I think we learned that, in that situation or in similar situations, the United States cannot act alone. We had the support of the Organization of American States to authorize this regional defense action. We had the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations as a forum, as a source of counsel for patience and restraint. We had our Allies in Europe who gave us support. Even neutral nations in Africa, fearful of what was coming in the world, denied landing rights to Soviet airplanes with which the Soviets had planned to convey arms and fuel to the missile sites in Cuba. So Allies and the United Nations still matter a great deal.
GRANOFF: You would not recommend unilateralism by one superpower?
SORENSEN: Never.
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Interview with Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala About Thirteen Days
JONATHAN GRANOFF: We are privileged to have with us Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala who is the Under Secretary General of the United Nations with the special charge of Disarmament Affairs.
Why is the movie Thirteen Days an important movie?
AMBASSADOR JAYANTHA DHANAPALA: Memories are very short. This is a crisis that took place almost 40 years ago. There are a number of generations that have very little knowledge of the critical period we passed through in 1962. We almost had a nuclear holocaust, an Armageddon. Many people do not understand this until they actually see the film, which is a remarkable historical reconstruction.
Secondly, I think that as long as we have nuclear weapons we are going to reenact this kind of critical situation. Not so long ago, in 1995, there was a test firing of a rocket in Norway. This was completely misread by the Russian Federation, and we almost had another situation similar to the Cuban Missile Crisisexcept by accident. Fortunately, within minutes of the button being pressed, the Russians were reassured that this was a test firing and normalcy was restored. We could, as long as we have nuclear weapons, have problems like these.
Thirdly, the movie demonstrates the need to create political space and time for diplomacy. Those thirteen days helped to prevent a crisis. If the hawks had been allowed to have their way they would have pushed that button as soon as they heard about the missiles in Cuba. Fortunately, wiser counsel prevailed and the diplomats had a chance to work out a solution to the problem, which saved millions of lives and probably the extermination of a number of U.S. and Russian cities.
Today, 187 countries, the five nuclear powersthe United States, Russia, China, Great Britain and Franceplus 182 other countries have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in which they agreed with the need to put nuclear weapons “off-alert” so as to give all parties time for diplomacy. They have also committed to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
GRANOFF: So the movie really is an affirmation that, if there is enough time, the process of human interaction and diplomacy is preferable to the terror of using these weapon?
DHANAPALA: Absolutely. It is an argument in favor of diplomacy over going to war, and it demonstrates, very powerfully, the need to eliminate nuclear weapons.
Why should we have these weapons which could irretrievably exterminate humankind and the ecosystem that supports it?
GRANOFF: There are many people who say that these weapons are a deterrent against more horrible situations, thereby bringing stability. They are willing to take the risk that they might be used. How should one respond to that argument?
DHANAPALA: The deterrence argument can neither be proved nor disproved in absolute logical terms. But we saw in the Cuban Missile Crisis the near failure of deterrence. I think that is an important fact. Those who still cling to the theory of deterrence should see this film and realize that deterrence cannot work all the time.
GRANOFF: I know General George Lee Butler, who was head of the Strategic Air Command of the United States, once said that nuclear deterrence is very dangerous because if it fails everything is lost. If conventional deterrence fails and conflict breaks out, there are weapons that can be used. As horrible as those wars are, they dont end civilizations.
There are people responding to the irrationality of deterrence who are now saying that we can build a shield around countries to protect and defend them against the threat of ballistic missiles. Is that a solution?
DHANAPALA: First of all we dont know whether the technology exists. People in the security area have always dreamed of an invulnerable, impermeable, foolproof shield. The United States alone has spent about $60 billion for a defense shield and it has not succeeded. It is possible that the tests held in the future might result in something that will be technologically feasible, but until that is proven I think we have to suspend judgement.
But more importantly, there are political costs in having such a shield. Immediately you undermine the Anti Ballistic Missile treaty, which was a bilateral treaty but which was regarded by all countries, until quite recently, as being the cornerstone of strategic stability. You are opening a Pandoras box to another arms race in ballistic missile proliferation. That is not going to be a stable situation.
GRANOFF: So you are saying that the weapons are still ready to be used, and that we could conceivably have another arms race like we did during the Cold War? You mentioned that there are treaties that affect whether we should even have nuclear weapons or not. Could you explain how these treaties work?
DHANAPALA: The treaties are tomes that have evolved over a period of time, and to which member states subscribe in large numbers today. The NPT is the primary treaty, and not only prevents horizontal proliferation (that is, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by more countries), but which also prevents the vertical proliferation (specifically Article VI of the NPT which talks about nuclear disarmament).
Now the meaning of Article VI has been strengthened by an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which has concluded that these talks for nuclear disarmament must be conducted in good faith and must be brought to a conclusion. These negotiations are not open-ended, and they cannot be allowed to delay the day when we can have the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Court also stated that the threat or the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the humanitarian principles of law.
GRANOFF: The International Court of Justice has said that there is a legal duty to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons and that their use would be contrary to humanitarian law?
DHANAPALA: Absolutely.
GRANOFF: What can citizens do once they understand the devastation nuclear weapons can cause?
DHANAPALA: During the height of the Cold War, especially in the 80s, there was a great upsurge of global public opinion. There were citizens action groups and demonstrations calling for a freeze or an end to all nuclear weapons.
Since the end of the Cold War, there is the false complacency that the danger from nuclear weapons has been averted, or has receded. That is not true.
What we need to see is more civil society energy devoted to this subject, which is so vitally connected to the survival of the human species and the survival of our planet. Unless we have more action-oriented civil society movements on this issue we are going to see the same apathy prevail, with the very great danger that our luck may run out and deterrence might fail.
GRANOFF: The movie Thirteen Days makes the point that it was human beings, making decisions from their own consciences and their own wisdom, that prevented the world from being destroyed. They were the heroes of our time. Ambassador Dhanapala is one of those heroes.
Ambassador Dhanapala, as President of the Review Conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, was one of the people who preserved the Treaty regime that keeps the number of nuclear weapons states in the world limited.
Ambassador Dhanapala, as President of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, as the Under Secretary General of Disarmament Affairs, and as a human being, how do you feel about dealing with an issue for which the fate of all humanity is at stake? What are your thoughts about the personal nature of that?
DHANAPALA: I believe passionately in the capacity of the international community to be able to change the current situation for the better. I believe that we can avert the total cataclysm that would result from the use of nuclear weapons. But the only guaranteed way to do that is to eliminate nuclear weapons.
We have eliminated chemical weapons through the Chemical Weapons Convention. We are slowly seeing the destruction of chemical weapons arsenals. We have destroyed the biological weapons evil with a Biological Weapons Convention that is soon to be strengthened with the adoption of a verification protocol. The only weapons of mass destruction that we have not de-legitimized are nuclear weapons. It will take leadership on the part of the countries that have nuclear weapons to demonstrate their great commitment.
We do not have to wait for another crisis like the Cuban Missile Crisis. We do not have to wait for another accidental nuclear war for us to realize the enormous destructive potential.
I am strongly committed to this, as I am indeed committed to other areas of disarmament. I believe that the international community can solve their problems through peaceful, political means, as the U.N. charter requires us to do, rather than through weapons of war, which is a very uncivilized and barbaric way to settle problems, particularly in the 21st century.
GRANOFF: Ambassador Dhanapala, thank you very much.
Posted by zack_allen at 09:37 AM
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Interview with Ambassador Richard Butler About Thirteen Days
Jonathan Granoff (JG): We have the privilege of speaking with Ambassador Richard Butler. Why is Thirteen Days an important movie for the people to see?
Richard Butler (RB): Jonathan, there have been two occasions which reveal the full power and horror of nuclear weapons: The first occasion was the dropping of the atom bombs over Japan in 1945. The second was the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Thirteen Days depicts the most dramatic instance in which nuclear weapons were almost used. We were very fortunate, in a number of ways, that President Kennedy and the team around him saw us through that great danger. The movie is a truly significant representation of a danger that has not gone away.
Although the events in this movie took place forty years ago, the nuclear threat is actually more dangerous today. The weapons that were involved then have been greatly superseded by increasingly powerful nuclear weapons. It took thirteen days to resolve the crisis. I dont know, and I dont think anyone should assume, that we would be as fortunate a second time.
We wont have that luxury next time.
GRANOFF: You are saying that we had thirteen days then and we would have less time now? We havent backed off and given ourselves more breathing room should there be a crisis?
BUTLER: The beginning of the nuclear age began with two nuclear weapons: the two that we used over Japan. In the subsequent 30 years, no less than 80,000 nuclear weapons were created. Throughout the Cold War period, the heavyweight, central strategic weapons were maintained on a status of hair-trigger alert.
Even though the Cold War ended ten years ago, people do not realize that the major strategic weapons remain on hair-trigger alertready for use at moments notice.
GRANOFF: Hair-trigger alert refers to the time between a perceived launch and the duty to return a launch?
BUTLER: I dont think that any of us knows exactly how much time that is, but it is a matter of minutes. People have a right to know this.
GRANOFF: It is a matter of minutes?
BUTLER: It is a matter of minutes between the moment the warning is given that an attack is underway and the time to authorize a launch of nuclear weapons in retaliation. That takes place in a matter of minutes.
GRANOFF: Is there any kind of shield that can be created to protect us from the launch of missiles?
BUTLER: No, there is not. There is talk now of a national ballistic missile defense shield. I think it is an extremely disturbing idea. Even those who most favor the idea of a shield do not contend that it would deal with the problem I have just described: the use of heavy-weight, intercontinental ballistic missiles on hair-trigger alert. These weapons are the central strategic systems of the United States and Russia. Missile defense doesnt deal with that problem at all.
GRANOFF: You were in charge of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq that was set up to get rid of the weapons of mass destruction under the control of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. You must have a unique perception of the dangers posed by terrorism and states led by tyrants with weapons of mass destruction.
What are your thoughts about how we can best deal with those kinds of situations and the dangers that they pose?
BUTLER: I was involved in the business of trying to get rid of Saddam Husseins weapons of mass destruction. I came to that job having spent 25 yearsall of my adult lifedealing with the problem of nuclear weapons.
The problem of nuclear weapons has many facesmore than we have time to talk about today. But allow me to focus on the central concerns.
1. Nuclear weapons are utterly devastating. They not only cause massive and indiscriminate damage through the size of the explosion involved, but they also release radioactivity. The consequences are simply incalculable for humanity and for the earth.
2. As long as they exist, one day they will be usedeither by decision or by accident. There have been over 50 records of accidents in which nuclear weapons were almost used, as in the movie Thirteen Days. I dont think anyone should assume that we would be as fortunate a second time.
Do you hear what I am saying? Nuclear weapons are devastating in their consequences. Their existence means that one day their devastating use will occur.
3. Finally, they are spreading. They are spreading because there is an axiom, an irrefutable truth, about nuclear weapons. It is this: as long as any one state or country has them, others will seek to acquire them. That has been the history of nuclear weapons.
I have not addressed the question of terrorist use. We must also expect that one-day they will end up in the hands of terrorist groups. That is almost too terrible to contemplate.
These are the three central truths about nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons threaten us all, and the only safe thing to do with them is eliminate them.
GRANOFF: In your opinion, the elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide is a viable, practical and do-able goalit is a goal that we can achieve in our lifetime?
BUTLER: Absolutely. It is the only safe way to solve the problem that nuclear weapons pose to all humanity.
But lest that sound too starry-eyed, let me make this clear: the main nuclear weapons statesthe United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Chinahave promised the world, legally promised the world, that they will eliminate their nuclear weapons. They have made that promise because they know that the only safe course is to eliminate them.
It concerns me that people dont know that the nuclear states have signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2000. They have promised in Article VI of the NPT to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
They have not been active enough in fulfilling that promise because it is very difficult to achieve.
Can it be done? Of course, it can be done. It is not beyond the will of political and military leaders to design the means through which nuclear weapons can be progressively and safely reduced without jeopardizing anyones security.
I am convinced that the more that is achieved, the more people will feel comfortable with it and want to get on with the next lot of reductions.
It can be done if people commit themselves to it. It can be done safely. It doesnt mean you can wave a wand over them. It wont happen overnight. But it can be done progressively until one day that goal of zero will be in sight.
I promise you, Jonathan, when people see that they will say: “My God, we are going to do this. We are actually going to get there.” And it will be done.
GRANOFF: It is clear that John F. Kennedy was committed to that goal after the Cuban Missile Crisis. There are a number of speeches where he made that his passionate plea that we take that sword from over our heads and get rid of it.
Ambassador Butler, I want to thank you so much for your time and for your words of inspiration. Thank you.
BUTLER: Thank you.
Thirteen Days is a great movie. It tells us some truths we need to know. We are very fortunate that Kennedy was there, that the job was done that was done. That he was able toand I think this is one of the more fascinating parts of the moviehe was able to resist what were naked attempts, unconstitutional attempts, by the military to take his power away from him. But he stood there and represented the people, the people of the United States, and indeed of the world, and got us through that crisis.
We may never have another such president or another such chance, which is why we must stay on the path to eliminate nuclear weapons.
Thank you.
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Questions and Answers About Thirteen Days with Ted Sorenson, Richard Butler, and Jonathan Granoff
Q: I am a consultant from the United Nations. Do you think that the situation today has changed, and that we have reached a comfort zone with these weapons whereby they may be used?
SORENSEN: Thats a very good question. I think that Washington D.C. and Moscow learned a very real lesson in 1962. There is no experience like gazing down a nuclear gun barrel at the other side and seeing them gazing back to make one recognize that there has to be some other way to resolve disputes.
But as your question suggests, there are other nuclear powers, or potential nuclear powers, in the world, some of them in very incendiary regions that havent had that experience. I only hope that they can watch this movie, study our history, and recognize that while weapons of mass destruction may have some deterrent value, to actually employ them would be madness.
Q: Mr. Sorensen, how historically accurate is the movie?
SORENSEN: The movie is not a documentary. It has the chronology slightly wrong on some of the events that took place. It obviously overstates a little bit the part played by Kevin Costner in order to have a star in the movie. Im in favor of having a star because I want as many people to see this movie as possible.
I think it short-changes, in some ways, the roles of Adlai Stevenson at the United Nations and McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Advisor to the President, and indeed, General Maxwell Taylor. The movie paints the military all black and the others all white, simplifying good and bad for dramatic purposes. But in fact, Gen. Taylor was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the only one who actually attended our sessions each day. While he was often on the other side of the issue, I found him to be a very thoughtful, intelligent, reasonable person.
The movie also paints General LeMay as evil. That part is right.
Q: Mr. Sorensen, there is a fascinating moment in the film where Dean Rusk is instructed to get unanimity out of the OAS. We are next shown a tantalizing scene in which that apparently was achieved. How was that done? What implications does it have for the future?
SORENSEN: The OAS, though often ignored, played a crucial role in that situation. Cubas voting participation in the OAS had been suspended, so it had no vote during that period. If I recall correctly, one representative had not yet received instructions from his capital and therefore felt he had to abstain. But everyone else voted to endorse and to authorize the quarantine, and indeed to participate in it. As I recall, Latin American ships participated in the quarantine.
It is another example of how, if we did not have multilateral organizations we would have to invent them. The OAS and the United Nations are the only such bodies that can play that kind of role in a moment of crisis.
Although there are all kinds of rules and resolutions against them, nuclear weapons seem to stay around, whether licitly or illicitly. It would certainly be a much safer world if we could limit nuclear weapons, in the same way that the United States would be a much safer nation if we only had the fewest number of guns floating around in our society.
There has been talk of reducing nuclear weapons to the barest minimum where they could perhaps serve some deterrent purpose. Mutual deterrence worked during the worst days of the Cold War only because there were rational people on both sides who recognized that there was no such thing as nuclear victory. They realized that a first nuclear strike would result in a counterstrike that would wreak such devastation as to make life intolerable for those who survived.
I am concerned about nuclear weapons falling into the hands of those who for emotional, nationalistic, or other reasons, may not think rationally when it comes time to choose whether to use those weapons or not. That is the danger I think this generation faces.
Q: Could you tell us a bit more about the United Nations and the Security Council? You mentioned that Adlai Stevensons role was a bit short-changed in the movie. Id appreciate hearing more about that.
SORENSEN: As you saw in the movie, when the President came back from Chicago he met with the ExCom on Saturday, October 20. We met in the residence rather than in the Cabinet room. At that meeting Adlai Stevenson spoke in favor of a greater emphasis on diplomatic solutions. He mentioned the possibility of doing something about the missiles in Turkey. He also mentioned the possibility of making the U.S. base in Guantanamo, Cuba a negotiable item. He was savaged by some of the others in the room.
But when the meeting was over, the President, Robert Kennedy, and I stepped out on the balcony. The President, admiring Ambassador Stevensons courage, said to me, “In our draft speech we do need much more of a diplomatic offensive in addition to the defensive naval actions that we are taking.” That part of the speech was substantially beefed up in the redraft that took place that afternoon.
I found out years later that had had the letter not worked, had Khrushchev rejected the letter with the two accompanying messages from Robert Kennedyone about Turkey and the other about the urgency of moving very soonthen the President was exploring still another back-channel. Without it appearing to be a U.S. offer, Secretary General U-Thant might have made a very similar proposal regarding the removal of the Turkish bases to accompany the deal that called off the quarantine when the missiles were withdrawn.
Finally, you will notice from the movieand this was also true in the letterthat the original plan was that the United Nations would inspect the dismantling and the return of those missiles to Russia.
As it later turned out, both countries had sufficient photographic surveillance methods that the United Nations system was not needed. I am sorry to say the United Nations said their system would not be ready in time to watch the missiles leave Cuba, since the missiles were leaving immediatelywhich was exactly the way we wanted it. But the presence of the United Nations, the availability of the U.N. to serve that key role, was indispensable.
Bear in mind, I cannot help but add that this was a President of the United States who, unlike any president before or since, said in his inaugural address that the United Nations was the last best hope of mankind.
Q: Do you think, as some have suggested, that the timing of the films release was meant to sell the need for missile defense shields?
SORENSEN: No, I dont think that the movies release was coordinated to help or hurt any political or legislative cause. Many of my friends said to me, “If only this movie had come out a few months earlier,” emphasizing how important it is to have a president with foreign policy experience.
If anything, this movie demonstrates how futile a policy of national missile defense would be. There is no such system that could protect all of the United States. There is no such system that would prevent the delivery of nuclear weapons by some other means, such as in a suitcase coming over the border. When we see how many drugs and illegal immigrants come across those borders, we realize that no such system could protect us.
This movie demonstrates that no military answer is superior to a negotiated solution to remove the danger of nuclear weapons.
Do you want to add to that, Peter?
PETER ALMOND: You really covered the key points. The release had no connection to geopolitics or U.S. politics. The two points that I would add are anecdotal to movie making at this scale:
I have been involved with the preparation of this film with my key colleagues for five years. It is rather fluky when the resources come together to actually move ahead and complete a film of this size. It took five years. Quite frankly, it would have been much better if it had taken two years to get it all together.
1. We were quite disappointed with the distribution pattern of the film. It was coincidental that it was released into the winter period, when Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush had started talking about the missile shield. We had wanted the film to be out a good deal earlier so that it might have made a bigger difference in the fall campaign. We wanted it to be released on a very wide platform as soon as possible.
SORENSEN: The idea of combating missile attacks has been around for a very long time. If I remember correctly, we inherited a system when President Kennedy took office in 1961 called the Nike Zeus Anti-Missile Missile. Funny, I never heard anyone refer to it during the thirteen days as being of any use whatsoever.
Q: In the movie, Thirteen Days, emphasis is placed on the linguistic aspects of military strategy, and that this new language is being created in diplomacy. Would you comment on the diplomatic implications of National Missile Defense in linguistic terms? What does that mean for nuclear proliferation, which you emphasize as being the greatest threat?
SORENSEN: The words national missile defense are a contradiction in terms. First of all, what would be the real value, to say nothing of the consequences, of the United States having a true shield that somehow protected the United States but protected no one else in the world? It would destroy alliances of cooperation, confidence in our restraint, and our willingness to share their pain.
The third word, in that trio, defense, is a misnomer. No system has been invented which can provide an absolute defense.
We looked at the question of national missile defense in a wholly different series of meetings, unrelated to the Cuban Missile Crisis, back in the Kennedy Administration. Scientists in whom we had some confidence advised us that no such perfect system was possible. The offense would always get ahead of defense, no matter how thoroughly a defense was developed. No system could sort out 50 decoys coming along with one real missileand make certain that the actual missile was the item hit and not getting through. “Defense” is a misnomer.
The United States is relatively free from the threat of destruction today. But I am willing to wager that in a list of the 15 most likely means of a destructive attack upon the United States, nuclear missiles flying through space would rank number 15, at best.
Q: What is the cost of this film? How much support did you convince the United States military to give in the making of this film?
ALMOND: It is reported that the movie cost in the neighborhood of $80 million, and thats before the marketing costs. As to the military cooperation, that is a long and interesting story.
We had extended negotiations and discussions, and an exchange of notes with the Department of Defense and their public affairs representatives. Briefly said, they did not approve of the script. They did not approve of subsequent modifications that we made in response to their notes. However, they gave us access to archives, to research data, and to “non-active assets,” as they refer to them.
In other words, they would not loan us a destroyer to film. We had to float the Joseph P. Kennedy out of Fall River, Massachusetts into the Narragansett Bay to film that sequence, the sequence of the blockade. We went to the Philippines and rebuilt the RFA Crusader reconnaissance planes from Philippine Airforce rejects. We built the air fleet that you see at Clark Airbase north of Manila in the Philippines. Similarly we shot the jungle sequence and built that entire missile site.
Q: We were surprised by the role of Robert Kennedy. Was it historically correct that he was so close in all the decision-making?
SORENSEN: Yes.
Q: Do you think that the relationship between the presidency and the media was well presented in the movie? Do you think that relationship has changed dramatically today? In what way would that have an impact today on a decision-making process in a similar crisis?
SORENSEN: As indicated in the film, word of the Crisis, without many specifics, began to seep out during the last day, before the President went on the air. Im not certain now which person made which call, but The Washington Post and The New York Times were the two newspapers, not surprisingly, that had some wind of what was happening.
As the movie accurately depicted, McGeorge Bundy called the publisher of the one newspaper and the President called the publisher of the other. They pleaded with them to not release anything that might endanger lives until the President had had an opportunity to present the full casewhat was happening and what our response was going to beto the American people Monday evening, October 22.
We wanted to avoid panic. We wanted to avoid having the Soviet Union know in advance what our plans were. We wanted to avoid any premature pressures to change those plans. Both newspapers responded that they would wait until the following morning. I doubt that they would today.
GRANOFF: On behalf of the American Bar Associations Section of International Law, on behalf of the NGO Committee on Disarmament, the Global Security Institute, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, Lawyers Alliance for World Security, the sponsoring Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), I want particularly to express our gratitude to the Department of Disarmament Affairs.
In 2000, 187 countries made a legal commitment under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was expressed in the recent Review Conference of that Treaty in last spring. In the treaty they confirmed, and I quote, “ an unequivocal undertaking to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the five nuclear weapons states, pursuant to their legal promises under Article VI of that Treaty, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
The highest court in the world, the International Court of Justice, in addressing the legal requirements that flow from that Treaty, has stated that there is a duty to negotiate in good faith and complete negotiations on the global abolition, elimination of nuclear weapons. So the legal norm to that effect has been stated, but clearly the political will has not arisen.
Senator Alan Cranston educated me to realize that a peace based on the threat to kill hundreds of millions of innocent people is an unworthy peace. It is a peace under terror. Hitler had to drag 6 million people to the ovens. We have now put wings on the ovens. As we speak, those ovens are flying about and ready to deliver their horrific payload.
For me, the movie Thirteen Days is a renewed wake-up call. The combination of human fallibility and technological prowess compel me to say it is time that we reigned in these weapons through the constraints of morality, law, and human cooperation.
Ted Sorensen is proof that human wisdom can constrain this horror. Ted Sorensen and the people that we saw in the film are proof and inspiration that we can accomplish the task.
I hope that all of you who watch the movie, Thirteen Days, will join us in working to achieve that goal.
Thank you very much.
Posted by zack_allen
March 01, 2001
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GSI Hosts Thirteen Days in Washington, D.C.
WASHINGTON, D.C.: On February 6th, the GSI hosted an exclusive screening of Thirteen Days for the U.S. Congress. The screening of the critically acclaimed drama about the Cuban Missile Crisis was held in the Coolidge Auditorium of the Library of Congress, and arranged in cooperation with the films producers, Lawyers Alliance for World Security, and Representatives Edward J. Markey (D-MA) and Christopher Shays (R-CT), co-chairs of the House of Representatives Bipartisan Task Force on Non-proliferation.
The packed, bipartisan audience of more than 500 guests included 16 Members of Congress, 2 foreign ambassadors, and staff from the offices of 126 Representatives and 26 Senators, including House and Senate leadership. Also in attendance were several journalists and columnists as well as representatives from 21 government agencies, departments and congressional committees, and 23 organizations and educational institutions. Audience members took with them 15 boxes of GSI Annual Reports, LAWS White Papers on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and National Missile Defense, MPIs Naked Nuclear Emperor, and other nuclear abolition advocacy literature.
The screening was followed by a panel discussion and reception with Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense; Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Universitys Kennedy School of Government; and Roald Sagdeev, former Science Advisor to President Mikhail Gorbachev.
Thirteen Days Demonstrates Imperative of Nuclear Weapon Abolition
Secretary McNamara, who helped guide President Kennedy through the crisis, reflected on his memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis and his views on the ongoing nuclear threat.
“In the end we avoided nuclear war by a hairs breadth,” McNamara said. “And it didnt have a damn thing to do with the so-called best and the brightest. The basic thrust of [the movie] is absolutely correct. We came that close to nuclear war. It was luck that prevented us from blundering into it. And the conclusion you should come to is that the indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons will lead to destruction of nations.”
A Lesson for Modern Times
McNamara and other experts warned that the film has serious lessons for todays leaders, and applauded President Bushs campaign commitment to take the U.S. nuclear arsenal off hair-trigger alert and to make deep reductions in nuclear stockpiles. They cautioned that such vital threat-reducing steps are incompatible, however, with the new administrations plans for a national missile defense, which is internationally destabilizing.
“The proposed national missile defense plans have serious flaws and can never be reliably tested,” remarked Global Security Institute CEO Jonathan Granoff. “The question is not whether we can build it, but whether we should. Missile defense, regardless of its technical merits, will stimulate an arms race with China, provoking India and Pakistan to follow suit. It provides no defense against a suitcase bomb or a tugboat in New York Harbor. It does not help move us toward a world that removes the unacceptable risk that nuclear weapons pose.”
By contrast, de-alerting nuclear weapons would provide a safety zone for any future crises. Congressman Ed Markey commented, “During the campaign, candidate Bush declared his interest in a mutual U.S.-Russia initiative to take our nuclear weapons off of hair-trigger alert. In 1962 we had 13 days. In this new era we may only have 13 minutes. President Bush should follow through on de-alerting as the way to find the time human beings need to make wise decisions about weapons of mass destruction.”
The Media Take Note
In her column on February 8th, Washington Post columnist Mary McGrory wrote about the attention being given to Thirteen Days, and referenced the Library of Congress screening. On Thursday, February 22, Robert McNamara and Peter Almond, the movies producer, appeared on The News Hour with Jim Lehrer to talk about the film and its contemporary importance.
Thirteen Days was the first film screened by President Bush in the White House theater. He was joined by Senator Ted Kennedy for that screening. It was also the movie selection for the House Democrats on the bus ride returning from their annual retreat.
The Global Security Institute, with Ted Sorenson, is sponsoring screenings of Thirteen Days for the diplomatic corps of the United Nations on March 7th and in July. Please contact GSI if you would like to attend.
Posted by zack_allen