September 26, 2003
Greek Foreign Ministry: Report on May 30-31 2003 Conference on Nuclear Proliferation
Introduction.
The Center for Analysis and Planning of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs organized in Athens on May 30-31 2003 an International Conference on Nuclear Proliferation. The participants (see Appendix I) were from nations that possess nuclear weapons, since one of the aims of the Conference was to change the methodological paradigm of nuclear arms control from bilateral, as was the case during the Cold War, to multilateral. Initiatives and policies were sought that would be beneficial to all nuclear and non-nuclear states alike.
The Conference focused first on a review of the current trends in nuclear weapons proliferation and their causes, and second on measures and policies that could strengthen non-proliferation.
The Review.
There was consensus among the participants both about the continuing utility and importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, but also about the fact that the NPT-established “norm of no acquisition” of nuclear weapons is fraying and does nor offer any more the powerful
disincentive to nuclearization that the NPT did until about five years ago. The participants identified several causes for this development.
1. The reaction of most nations to the 1998 declaration by India and Pakistan that they are nuclear states by testing their nuclear weapons was mild, perhaps because both States were not signatories of the NPT. Their overt nuclear status was accepted, little damage was done to their national interests, there was little evidence that their nuclearization was seen as an intolerable violation of an important international norm. That fact has eroded the political taboo of nuclear weapons acquisition.
2. Both the United States and NATO have recently affirmed strongly the utility and legality of nuclear weapons by claiming that “they are essential for the foreseeable future”, and that “they play a critical role in the defense capabilities” of the US. More recently the US declaration that this nation is prepared to use nuclear weapons “pre-emptively” against even non nuclear States has not only disappointed many nations that have signed the NPT with the explicit understanding (Article VI) that the nuclear States will work towards nuclear disarmament, but additionally has promoted nuclear proliferation among signatories as a deterrent measure against political pressures or nuclear threats. North Korea and Iran are primary examples of this effect. In addition the US military have expressed the need for a new generation of nuclear weapons, foreshadowing the possibility of abandoning the restrictions of CTBT, a clear sign for many NPT signatories that the US is repudiating arms control as a security policy. In parallel Russia has re-emphasized use of its nuclear arsenal (because of the decay of its conventional forces) and declared that it will resort to first use of nuclear weapons abandoning its long-standing declared policy not to do so.
3. The acquisition of fissile material for the construction of nuclear weapons by both States and parastatal entities (terrorists) has been made easier since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia possesses thousands of tons of weapons’ grade Uranium. Most of this is in relatively poorly guarded facilities and if it finds its way into the nuclear black market one of the stronger technical barriers to non-proliferation will collapse. In parallel Pakistan and N. Korea are also potential sources of weapons’ materials. In the former, Al Queda followers could avail themselves of nuclear weapons materials. In the case of the latter, this impoverished nation could simply sell weapons’ grade fissile material to the highest bidder. In both cases non-proliferation would be seriously compromised.
4. Nuclear proliferation is not high on the political agenda of most developed and developing nations. In the EU for example the threat of nuclear proliferation to additional States has not been given until recently a high priority. Nor is the acquisition of a crude nuclear device by a parastatal group of serious concern: terrorist acts are thought to be directed against the US, or possibly the UK. However efforts are currently under way to tackle these issues more urgently and effectively. In addition political and economic considerations appear to take precedence over nuclearization concerns as is the case with Iran. Strategic considerations also may weaken the resolve of some nuclear nations to support the NPT vigorously. Russia for example may favour additional nuclear nations as a counter to US expansionism. In turn the US does not appear to support resolution of the Kashmir problem that animates nuclear confrontation in the subcontinent.
5. Inadequate attention is being paid to the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons’ fissile materials by terrorist groups: Successful measures to prevent such eventuality are quite distinct from the traditional efforts to block nuclear proliferation among states, but such measures are not being pursued systematically. Recent incidents of terrorism a-la 9/11 were perpetuated not to establish a bargaining position towards a political goal as was in the past the case with European terrorist groups, but to oust an invader through personal sacrifice, which can be thought of as a form of holy war. Such terrorist practices can easily expand to the use of nuclear or radiological explosives. Yet to date this risk remains ill-defined, and its nuclear proliferation implications remain inadequately addressed.
6. One weakness of the NPT, built into its original version, is that it does not provide the authority or the resources needed to investigate nuclear projects, in nations that have signed the NPT, which appear to be devoted to nuclear weapons development. In fact the IAEA, responsible for overseeing nuclear activities in signatory nations, can only inspect declared civilian facilities that do not engage in prohibited work. But it is possible for a nation with such facilities to pursue nuclear weapons development in undeclared, even if known to the IAEA facilities that the IAEA cannot inspect. As a consequence the NPT does not provide the mandate for IAEA to detect and stop secret nuclear weapons work. Furthermore the NPT does not provide for sanctions or punishment of signatory nations that are found to work on nuclear weapons. Neither are there clearly established norms and thresholds which when violated would lead automatically to sanctions, themselves undefined at the present time. Therefore many believe that at least in its present form the NPT is a weak tool with which to arrest nuclear proliferation effectively.
The participants concluded that the norms against nuclear proliferation that the NPT established and under-girds have been weakened most recently by the dismissal of the NPT by the US Government as an effective tool against nuclear proliferation and its substitution by a unilateral,
muscular response of pre-emption.
Recommendations.
The participants agreed that the NPT can be effectively strengthened and become once again a barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons to additional States or parastatal entities. Towards that objective the participants offered a series of ameliorative technical and political suggestions.
1. Strengthen the ability of IAEA to inspect undeclared nuclear facilities in signatory nations, and thereby be able to detect prohibited nuclear weapons work. In addition enable the IAEA to impose sanctions through the Security Council that could even resort to military action against such facilities. But such use of force must be multilateral, co-operative in the name of Common Security, and under the rubric of international law.
2. In order to apply such policy it will be necessary to define a priori the threshold of violations that would trigger sanctions or military action. “Who decides”, “who acts”, and “what specific action would be appropriate” are questions that must have well defined, widely accepted answers. This approach combines the multilateral character of the NPT under international law with the more robust pre-emptive approach advocated by the US.
3. The US and NATO must de-emphasize the importance of nuclear weapons and the former must return to the multilateral arms control approach of all previous US Administrations, abandon its strategy of “global dominance for ever through military superiority” and refrain from the “axis of evil” rhetoric that causes prudent policy makers in threatened nations to opt for nuclear deterrence to counter the US threats. At EU’s insistence NATO could be persuaded to remove all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.
4. Since the bottleneck in the development of nuclear weapons is the acquisition of weapons’ grade fissile material and technical know-how, the participants emphasized the importance of a number of policies and measures that would raise the barrier to such acquisition.
a. Address urgently the problem of “Russian loose nukes”, the fact that thousands of tons of weapons’ grade Uranium is available in Russia. The “$10 billion + $10 billion over ten years” (10+10/10) is an effort in the right direction but must be accelerated. A parallel approach towards the same goal would be Russian efforts to secure the fissile material in exchange for debt relief from the EU nations.
b. Multilateralize and denationalize the supply of nuclear fuels for power generation reactors. Often states with nuclear ambitions initiate civilian peaceful nuclear energy programs that involve the construction of nuclear reactors and facilities for the enrichment of natural Uranium with which to manufacture the reactor fuel rods. Such programs are allowed, in fact encouraged by the NPT but often constitute early camouflage for weapons development activities. To cut off this route to nuclear weapons acquisition, it is proposed that the supply of reactor fuel is internationalized and guaranteed to all nations thereby removing the need for national, indigenous enrichment facilities that can be used to produce reactor fuel but also highly enriched Uranium for weapons. EURATOM provides a working example of international reactor fuel supply.
c. In parallel with the internationalization of reactor fuel supply it will be necessary to strengthen the IAEA verification capabilities, and the transparency of dual-use technologies licensing and transfer. One way to achieve that is to relate transparency in nuclear activities of a nation to technology transfers to it needed for the development of its nuclear power industry.
d. The NPT signatories should address urgently and systematically the danger of acquisition of weapons’ grade fissile materials by parastatal entities. Emphasis should be placed on the detection and interception of transfer of such materials, or even ready nuclear explosives, from Russia, Pakistan or N.Korea, to parastatal organizations or groups. This is a fundamentally different task than the detection of nuclear weapons activities in national entities and therefore it is not a task for the IAEA alone but of international organizations more broadly.
5. In addition to these technical measures a series of political steps can strengthen the effectiveness of the NPT:
a. Address the Muslim world’s hostility towards the US in particular and sections of the western world in general.
b. The EU and the US should become engaged in an effort to resolve the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir in order to remove this powerful, ominous driver of nuclear confrontation.
c. Bring the nuclear proliferation problem to the attention of the EU leadership and to the broader EU public.
d. Downgrade the political value of nuclear arsenals and reaffirm the taboo against the acquisition of nuclear explosives. This is an essential political step since some nations may want to acquire nuclear weapons for prestige reasons or as a manifestation of dominant regional status.
e. Insist that all NPT signatories subscribe to the new, expanded protocol that provides the IAEA with additional powers of inspection and therefore detection of potential violations of the terms of the Treaty.
At the end of the Conference the participants thanked the Greek Foreign Ministry for its timely initiative to examine ways to staunch nuclear proliferation by strengthening the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.
Participants.
Pervez HOODBHOY
Physics Dept.
QAU, Islamabad, Pakistan
Gerassimos ARSENIS
Greek Parliament
Randy RYDELL
UN Dept. for Disarmament Affairs
N.Y.C, N.Y
Dr.Paul CORNISH
Director, Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London
Franciscos VERROS
Ambassador, Director, International Organisations
Foreign Affairs Ministry, Athens
Dr.Efraim ASKOULAI
Research Associate, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
Tel-Aviv University
Loukas KARATSOLIS
Councellor, Athens
Alexander NIKITIN
Director, Center for Political and International Studies,
Kosta TSIPIS
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Joseph CIRINCIONE
Director, Non-Proliferation Project
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Steven MILLER
Kennedy School of Government
Jonathan GRANOFF
President, Global Security Institute
Posted by zack_allen at 02:41 PM
September 18, 2003
EVENT RESCHEDULED: Michael Douglas, Jane Goodall Urge Greater Cooperation in Addressing Global Security Threats
DUE TO HURRICANE ISABEL, THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RESCHEDULED FROM SEPTEMBER 18 TO OCTOBER 2. PLEASE WATCH FOR UPDATES.
On Thursday, October 2, actor, producer, and director Michael Douglas and noted primatologist Dr. Jane Goodall will speak on Capitol Hill. In separate keynotes, they will urge U.S. policy makers to pursue greater cooperation — both at home and abroad — when addressing global security threats. A panel discussion, featuring Congressmen Ed Markey (D-MA) and Christopher Shays (R-CT), as well as Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. (Ret.) will follow.
The non-partisan event is sponsored by the House of Representatives Bipartisan Task Force on Non-Proliferation. The Bipartisan Security Group is pleased to cooperate in the planning of this event.
Under the title, “The Limits of Unilateralism,” the speakers will discuss the imperative of bipartisan cooperation in Congress, and multilateral cooperation among nations, when it comes to advancing issues of global concern, such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the health of the earth’s biosphere, sustainable economic development, or the peaceful resolution of political conflicts within the UN framework.
Congressmen Markey and Shays are the Co-chairs of the House of Representatives Bipartisan Task Force on Nonproliferation. Ambassador Graham is the Chair of the Bipartisan Security Group, a program of the Global Security Institute.
The event is open to the interested public, but space is limited. To RSVP please call Zack Allen at 415-775-6760 or email events@gsinstitute.org.
Thursday, October 2, 2003
Time: 2:00 pm
Room: 2154 Rayburn House Office Building
Capitol Hill
Washington, DC
For more information about the Nonproliferation Task Force or the event, please have your staff contact Ramsey Hoguet or Cara Ciccarelli (Rep. Markey) at 225-2836 or Jordan Press (Rep. Shays) at 225-5541. If you have questions about the Bipartisan Security Group please contact Ambassador Robert Grey at 202-543-9017.
Press Contact: Israel Klein (Rep. Markey): 202-225-2836 or Jordan Press (Rep. Shays): 202-225-5541.
Photo of Dr. Goodall by Michael Collopy.
Photo of Mr. Douglas by GSI.
Posted by zack_allen at 01:46 PM
September 11, 2003
In Memoriam: Anna Lindh, Foreign Minister of Sweden
The world has lost one its brightest lights. Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh passed away from multiple stab wounds inflicted by an unknown assailant yesterday.
She was a tireless advocate for nuclear disarmament and human rights and considered a likely candidate for Prime Minister. She was appropriately immensely popular in Sweden.
At the 2001 Conference of the States Parties to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, where Secretary General Kofi Annan emphasized that moving toward the elimination of nuclear weapons should be accelerated in the shadow of 9/11, her character and courage shined.
Jonathan Granoff recalled Anna Lindh’s presence at the event: “She brought two beautiful sons, both under 12 at the time, to the event. As she spoke, with clarity and force, on the need to rid the world of nuclear threats, I noted that a mother would not bring her children to such a public gathering unless she intended to speak from the heart what she really believed. The United States virtually boycotted the event and I reflected on the integrity she exhibited in comparison to the position of my country. I actually cried at the juxtaposition. Anna Lindh was the kind of person who could so touch people.”
He continued, “The best way to honor her memory is to live up to the ideals that she advocated. May God bless her with eternal and perfect love, peace and grace. ”
The following is a speech Anna Lindh delivered in 2000 that resonates today:
STATEMENT TO THE NPT 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE
H.E. MS. ANNA LINDH
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SWEDEN
New York, 25 April 2000
Mr. President,
Let me begin by congratulating you on your election as President of this Conference. Its success lies in your hands and I can assure you of the support of the Swedish delegation in this important endeavour.
Sweden fully subscribes to the European Union statement and the views expressed by Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition.
Mr. President,
The late 80s and early 90s were a time of hope. A time of great political change and opening towards democracy. A time when decades of cold war gave way for disarmament and increased security. A time when the positive developments led us to believe that the nuclear threat was history.
Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we must ask ourselves: What went wrong?
Thirty years after the entry into force of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) we face a near stand-still in nuclear disarmament negotiations in fact, since 1995 we have seen more set-backs than progress in nuclear disarmament. The US Senate has refused to approve the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), while China and other states have not yet ratified it. Nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan contribute to a deteriorating regional security situation in South Asia. The situation concerning weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East gives cause for concern. North Korea remains in violation of its NPT obligations. The United States are making plans for a national missile defence system which might restart the nuclear missile race. Are these temporary setbacks or are we seeing the beginning of a new era of mistrust?
Out of concern for this situation, Sweden together with seven other non-nuclear-weapon states and with the strong support of the majority of non-nuclear-weapon states and the NGO community, launched a new initiative in 1998 calling for progress towards the treaty-bound objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Today, there is still an urgent need to turn the commitment to the 1995 Principles and Objectives into practical disarmament steps. This meeting takes place at a decisive moment in the nuclear era. It is the right time and place to get the process restarted.
If we do not act today, we, the generation which rallied against nuclear weapons and for peace, will see our own children demonstrating against us.
The NPT is based on balanced commitments. The majority of states have agreed to forego the nuclear option in return for negotiations in good faith, chiefly among the five nuclear-weapon states, towards nuclear disarmament. Our common goal is a nuclear-weapon-free world. This is the foundation of the global non-proliferation regime. The absence of negotiations on disarmament would risk eroding the NPT regime.
In 1995, the nuclear-weapon states committed themselves to a programme of action that included “the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally”.
Some positive steps have been taken in this regard. The systematic implementation of the START I treaty ahead of schedule, by the United States and Russia, is one. The unilateral reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons by France, the United Kingdom and the US, is another. We consider the comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty an important achievement and we also welcome the strengthening of the Safeguards system. The efforts by some nuclear-weapon states to increase transparency in the disarmament process and to place fissile material under appropriate international safeguards should be acknowledged. We also welcome the UN Disarmament Commission’s valuable work on nuclear-weapon-free zones.
However, this is far from enough. Let me point out four areas of concern, where we lack progress or where we face new problems. These are:
– reducing nuclear weapons arsenals
– bringing into force the CTBT
– halting the development of new weapons and systems
– nuclear weapons in regional conflicts.
We need reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals. Instead, thousands of strategic nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert. In some countries there is a tendency to accord nuclear weapons a growing importance in military doctrines and postures. This is unacceptable.
Although this certainly applies to all nuclear-weapon states, those with the largest arsenals bear a special responsibility. The Swedish Government calls on the Russian Federation and the United States to accelerate the process which, together with measures adopted by the other three nuclear-weapon states, will lead to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Sweden strongly supports the START process and recalls the 1985 joint US-Soviet statement entailing
commitments to reductions in nuclear armaments to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.
While of course welcoming Russia’s ratification of the START II treaty, Sweden remains deeply concerned that it still has not entered into force seven years after being signed and that negotiations on START III are not yet underway. The Russian Federation and the United States must now assume their special responsibility, bring START II and its protocol into force without further delay and immediately begin negotiations on a START III treaty.
Sweden welcomes the unilateral reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons carried out by some nuclear-weapon states and calls for further cutbacks by the remaining ones – in particular the Russian Federation. We also call for transparency in holdings of non-strategic nuclear weapons. These weapons have outlived themselves and have no place in the 21st century.
We need the entry-into-force of the CTBT. In this context, we warmly welcome the progress achieved through Russia’s on-going ratification. All other states that have not yet done so, in particular the United States and China, should now follow suit. A special responsibility to show immediate progress rests on India, Pakistan and North Korea, who have not yet signed the treaty.
No states – and least of all the nuclear-weapon states – have the right to hold our common security environment hostage to domestic policies. Nor is it acceptable that differences between the nuclear-weapon states on unrelated issues should interfere with their responsibility for advancing the nuclear arms control agenda.
We need an end to the development of nuclear weapons once and for all. Sweden remains committed to negotiating a Treaty on fissile material eased on the Shannon report, which would effectively prevent the further development of nuclear weapons. We cannot accept attempts by China or any other state to block progress on this crucial Treaty. China and all other States that have not yet done so must immediately cease production of fissile material for weapons purposes and refrain from further development of nuclear weapons.
My Government is deeply concerned about the United States’ plans for a national missile defence (NMD) system. Such a system could run counter to efforts to halt proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Proliferation must instead be met by strengthening the non-proliferation regime. An NMD system would put in question the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) which is repeatedly referred to by
both States Parties as being a cornerstone of strategic stability. There is a risk that such actions jeopardise this balance, and have negative consequences for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. I reiterate Sweden’s call on the States Parties to refrain from an deployment that could create uncertainties. Russia and the United States share the responsibility for negotiating it solution that will have a positive impact on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
This said, the debate must not be taken as a pretext for continued development of nuclear weapons There is no excuse for departing from the road towards nuclear disarmament.
We need a halt to regional nuclear threats. In June 1998 India and Pakistan carried out test explosions of nuclear weapons. This deplorable development constituted a serious blow to the global non-proliferation regime. Far from Improving the security of the States concerned, these nuclear tests set off an arms race that constitutes a risk to peace and security in the entire region.
India and Pakistan must reverse their nuclear ambitions in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1172. They both have a responsibility to leave the path of escalation and return to regional security. Signing the Test-Ban Treaty would be the first step in that direction.
The situation regarding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East to be a cause for concern. Iraq continuously tries to evade inspections to which it is bound by Security Council resolutions. We urge Iraq to co-operate with the UN Monitoring, Observation and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC). The countries of the region must take decisive steps to wards a comprehensive solution to the security situation, including the setting up of a zone free of
weapons of mass destruction.
On the Korean Peninsula, Sweden hopes for a solution to the nuclear situation, based on the “Agreed Framework” between the US and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Sweden, along with the EU, supports these efforts through participation in the KEDO project. We urge all States concerned to exercise restraint and to refrain from developing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Meanwhile, the DPRK must abide by its safeguard commitments in accordance with article III of the NPT.
Mr President,
Sweden strongly supports the Safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy System (IAEA) We have assisted several new states of the former Soviet Union in setting tip their own nuclear accountancy systems. We welcome the approval in 1997 of a system which a ill strengthen the IAEA’s ability to detect secret nuclear weapons programmes. However, the rate of ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards agreement must be speeded up. Sweden is now ready to ratify the Protocol nationally.
Together with our partners in the European Union we have also agreed to conclude our collective ratification process as soon as possible and urge all other States parties to make the same efforts.
Illicit trafficking is a threat to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Swedish Government co-operates with several states in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as with the IAEA, to improve physical protection and prevent illicit trafficking. We call upon states to accede to the Physical Protection Convention as soon as possible and to implement fully their ensuing commitments. Thought should be given to co-operative measures, including verification, which would strengthen world-wide physical protection.
Mr. President,
My Government remains committed to co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, for instance in agriculture, medicine and water resource management. I welcome the IAEA’s efforts to align its activities in this field more closely with those of the developing countries. Export control has an important role to play in facilitating such co-operation whip preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons.
Any activities relating to nuclear applications must be based on internationally agreed safety standards. All states that have not yet done so should accede to all relevant conventions and fully implement their ensuing commitments.
Mr. President,
Some of the problems that we discuss at this Review conference are a legacy from a bygone political era, missed by few. Others are new arising from regional conflicts and the political and economic reality of globalization. They do, however, have one thing in common – that today the prospects for finding sustainable solutions are better than ever before. Provided that we have the political will and commitment, that is.
This Conference offers an opportunity to add more substance to the strengthened review process and to renew our commitment to the full implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We cannot afford to let it slip through our fingers.
Sweden calls on the Conference to commit to the following steps:
To undertake unequivocally to eliminate nuclear arsenals and to engage without delay in an accelerated process of negotiations thus achieving nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
To do its utmost to achieve the entry-into-force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty unconditionally and without delay.
To ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, through immediate negotiations as agreed in the Conference on Disarmament.
To increase transparency regarding strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenals and holdings of fissile material stocks.
Henceforth to let the principle of irreversibility guide all measures undertaken in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Mr. President,
We have four weeks to show to the world that the global non-proliferation regime still stands strong. We expect the nuclear-weapon states to implement their share of the NPT bargain. My Government will do everything in its power to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Posted by zack_allen at 10:04 AM