Introduction.
The Center for Analysis and Planning of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs organized in Athens on May 30-31 2003 an International Conference on Nuclear Proliferation. The participants (see Appendix I) were from nations that possess nuclear weapons, since one of the aims of the Conference was to change the methodological paradigm of nuclear arms control from bilateral, as was the case during the Cold War, to multilateral. Initiatives and policies were sought that would be beneficial to all nuclear and non-nuclear states alike.
The Conference focused first on a review of the current trends in nuclear weapons proliferation and their causes, and second on measures and policies that could strengthen non-proliferation.
The Review.
There was consensus among the participants both about the continuing utility and importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, but also about the fact that the NPT-established “norm of no acquisition” of nuclear weapons is fraying and does nor offer any more the powerful
disincentive to nuclearization that the NPT did until about five years ago. The participants identified several causes for this development.
1. The reaction of most nations to the 1998 declaration by India and Pakistan that they are nuclear states by testing their nuclear weapons was mild, perhaps because both States were not signatories of the NPT. Their overt nuclear status was accepted, little damage was done to their national interests, there was little evidence that their nuclearization was seen as an intolerable violation of an important international norm. That fact has eroded the political taboo of nuclear weapons acquisition.
2. Both the United States and NATO have recently affirmed strongly the utility and legality of nuclear weapons by claiming that “they are essential for the foreseeable future”, and that “they play a critical role in the defense capabilities” of the US. More recently the US declaration that this nation is prepared to use nuclear weapons “pre-emptively” against even non nuclear States has not only disappointed many nations that have signed the NPT with the explicit understanding (Article VI) that the nuclear States will work towards nuclear disarmament, but additionally has promoted nuclear proliferation among signatories as a deterrent measure against political pressures or nuclear threats. North Korea and Iran are primary examples of this effect. In addition the US military have expressed the need for a new generation of nuclear weapons, foreshadowing the possibility of abandoning the restrictions of CTBT, a clear sign for many NPT signatories that the US is repudiating arms control as a security policy. In parallel Russia has re-emphasized use of its nuclear arsenal (because of the decay of its conventional forces) and declared that it will resort to first use of nuclear weapons abandoning its long-standing declared policy not to do so.
3. The acquisition of fissile material for the construction of nuclear weapons by both States and parastatal entities (terrorists) has been made easier since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia possesses thousands of tons of weapons’ grade Uranium. Most of this is in relatively poorly guarded facilities and if it finds its way into the nuclear black market one of the stronger technical barriers to non-proliferation will collapse. In parallel Pakistan and N. Korea are also potential sources of weapons’ materials. In the former, Al Queda followers could avail themselves of nuclear weapons materials. In the case of the latter, this impoverished nation could simply sell weapons’ grade fissile material to the highest bidder. In both cases non-proliferation would be seriously compromised.
4. Nuclear proliferation is not high on the political agenda of most developed and developing nations. In the EU for example the threat of nuclear proliferation to additional States has not been given until recently a high priority. Nor is the acquisition of a crude nuclear device by a parastatal group of serious concern: terrorist acts are thought to be directed against the US, or possibly the UK. However efforts are currently under way to tackle these issues more urgently and effectively. In addition political and economic considerations appear to take precedence over nuclearization concerns as is the case with Iran. Strategic considerations also may weaken the resolve of some nuclear nations to support the NPT vigorously. Russia for example may favour additional nuclear nations as a counter to US expansionism. In turn the US does not appear to support resolution of the Kashmir problem that animates nuclear confrontation in the subcontinent.
5. Inadequate attention is being paid to the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons’ fissile materials by terrorist groups: Successful measures to prevent such eventuality are quite distinct from the traditional efforts to block nuclear proliferation among states, but such measures are not being pursued systematically. Recent incidents of terrorism a-la 9/11 were perpetuated not to establish a bargaining position towards a political goal as was in the past the case with European terrorist groups, but to oust an invader through personal sacrifice, which can be thought of as a form of holy war. Such terrorist practices can easily expand to the use of nuclear or radiological explosives. Yet to date this risk remains ill-defined, and its nuclear proliferation implications remain inadequately addressed.
6. One weakness of the NPT, built into its original version, is that it does not provide the authority or the resources needed to investigate nuclear projects, in nations that have signed the NPT, which appear to be devoted to nuclear weapons development. In fact the IAEA, responsible for overseeing nuclear activities in signatory nations, can only inspect declared civilian facilities that do not engage in prohibited work. But it is possible for a nation with such facilities to pursue nuclear weapons development in undeclared, even if known to the IAEA facilities that the IAEA cannot inspect. As a consequence the NPT does not provide the mandate for IAEA to detect and stop secret nuclear weapons work. Furthermore the NPT does not provide for sanctions or punishment of signatory nations that are found to work on nuclear weapons. Neither are there clearly established norms and thresholds which when violated would lead automatically to sanctions, themselves undefined at the present time. Therefore many believe that at least in its present form the NPT is a weak tool with which to arrest nuclear proliferation effectively.
The participants concluded that the norms against nuclear proliferation that the NPT established and under-girds have been weakened most recently by the dismissal of the NPT by the US Government as an effective tool against nuclear proliferation and its substitution by a unilateral,
muscular response of pre-emption.
Recommendations.
The participants agreed that the NPT can be effectively strengthened and become once again a barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons to additional States or parastatal entities. Towards that objective the participants offered a series of ameliorative technical and political suggestions.
1. Strengthen the ability of IAEA to inspect undeclared nuclear facilities in signatory nations, and thereby be able to detect prohibited nuclear weapons work. In addition enable the IAEA to impose sanctions through the Security Council that could even resort to military action against such facilities. But such use of force must be multilateral, co-operative in the name of Common Security, and under the rubric of international law.
2. In order to apply such policy it will be necessary to define a priori the threshold of violations that would trigger sanctions or military action. “Who decides”, “who acts”, and “what specific action would be appropriate” are questions that must have well defined, widely accepted answers. This approach combines the multilateral character of the NPT under international law with the more robust pre-emptive approach advocated by the US.
3. The US and NATO must de-emphasize the importance of nuclear weapons and the former must return to the multilateral arms control approach of all previous US Administrations, abandon its strategy of “global dominance for ever through military superiority” and refrain from the “axis of evil” rhetoric that causes prudent policy makers in threatened nations to opt for nuclear deterrence to counter the US threats. At EU’s insistence NATO could be persuaded to remove all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.
4. Since the bottleneck in the development of nuclear weapons is the acquisition of weapons’ grade fissile material and technical know-how, the participants emphasized the importance of a number of policies and measures that would raise the barrier to such acquisition.
a. Address urgently the problem of “Russian loose nukes”, the fact that thousands of tons of weapons’ grade Uranium is available in Russia. The “$10 billion + $10 billion over ten years” (10+10/10) is an effort in the right direction but must be accelerated. A parallel approach towards the same goal would be Russian efforts to secure the fissile material in exchange for debt relief from the EU nations.
b. Multilateralize and denationalize the supply of nuclear fuels for power generation reactors. Often states with nuclear ambitions initiate civilian peaceful nuclear energy programs that involve the construction of nuclear reactors and facilities for the enrichment of natural Uranium with which to manufacture the reactor fuel rods. Such programs are allowed, in fact encouraged by the NPT but often constitute early camouflage for weapons development activities. To cut off this route to nuclear weapons acquisition, it is proposed that the supply of reactor fuel is internationalized and guaranteed to all nations thereby removing the need for national, indigenous enrichment facilities that can be used to produce reactor fuel but also highly enriched Uranium for weapons. EURATOM provides a working example of international reactor fuel supply.
c. In parallel with the internationalization of reactor fuel supply it will be necessary to strengthen the IAEA verification capabilities, and the transparency of dual-use technologies licensing and transfer. One way to achieve that is to relate transparency in nuclear activities of a nation to technology transfers to it needed for the development of its nuclear power industry.
d. The NPT signatories should address urgently and systematically the danger of acquisition of weapons’ grade fissile materials by parastatal entities. Emphasis should be placed on the detection and interception of transfer of such materials, or even ready nuclear explosives, from Russia, Pakistan or N.Korea, to parastatal organizations or groups. This is a fundamentally different task than the detection of nuclear weapons activities in national entities and therefore it is not a task for the IAEA alone but of international organizations more broadly.
5. In addition to these technical measures a series of political steps can strengthen the effectiveness of the NPT:
a. Address the Muslim world’s hostility towards the US in particular and sections of the western world in general.
b. The EU and the US should become engaged in an effort to resolve the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir in order to remove this powerful, ominous driver of nuclear confrontation.
c. Bring the nuclear proliferation problem to the attention of the EU leadership and to the broader EU public.
d. Downgrade the political value of nuclear arsenals and reaffirm the taboo against the acquisition of nuclear explosives. This is an essential political step since some nations may want to acquire nuclear weapons for prestige reasons or as a manifestation of dominant regional status.
e. Insist that all NPT signatories subscribe to the new, expanded protocol that provides the IAEA with additional powers of inspection and therefore detection of potential violations of the terms of the Treaty.
At the end of the Conference the participants thanked the Greek Foreign Ministry for its timely initiative to examine ways to staunch nuclear proliferation by strengthening the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.
Participants.
Pervez HOODBHOY
Physics Dept.
QAU, Islamabad, Pakistan
Gerassimos ARSENIS
Greek Parliament
Randy RYDELL
UN Dept. for Disarmament Affairs
N.Y.C, N.Y
Dr.Paul CORNISH
Director, Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London
Franciscos VERROS
Ambassador, Director, International Organisations
Foreign Affairs Ministry, Athens
Dr.Efraim ASKOULAI
Research Associate, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
Tel-Aviv University
Loukas KARATSOLIS
Councellor, Athens
Alexander NIKITIN
Director, Center for Political and International Studies,
Kosta TSIPIS
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Joseph CIRINCIONE
Director, Non-Proliferation Project
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Steven MILLER
Kennedy School of Government
Jonathan GRANOFF
President, Global Security Institute
Posted by zack_allen