DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES
Panel discussion held April 11, 2001 in the United Nations by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, in cooperation with the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Department of Public Information.
Panelists:
AMBASSADOR NORMAN WULF, Special Representative for Non Proliferation of the US President, leader of the US delegation at the 2000 NPT Review Conference
VICTOR VASILIEV, Political Counsellor, Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN
MINISTER MARIA ANGELICA ARCE DE JEANNET, Mission of Mexico to the UN
JONATHAN GRANOFF, President, Global Security Institute; Vice President, Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS), Moderator.
Transcript:
JONATHAN GRANOFF: The very first resolution of the United Nations dealt with the elimination of atomic bombs. The nuclear weapons age began at 5:29am Mountain War Time, July 16, 1945 when the first atom bomb was tested and a portion of the bleak, barren, Alamogordo bombing range in the New Mexican desert, chillingly named Jornado de Muerto, (Journey of Death). After the thunderous roar of the shock wave, a huge pillar of smoke rose thirty thousand feet, creating the first icon of the nuclear age, the fearsome mushroom cloud. A blast of energy of unprecedented destructive magnitude bathed the surrounding mountainside in a brilliant light that could be seen up to 150 miles away. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, the organization responsible for the design of the first atomic bomb, uttered a sober description from the Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita. “Now I have become death, destroyer of worlds.”
Today, a generation later, there are currently more than 30,000 nuclear warheads worldwide. The United States has about 10,500, Russia maybe 20,000, France 450, China maybe around 400, the United Kingdom, a little less than 200. Yet we stand at an unprecedented moment of opportunity where none of the parties who have these weapons consider themselves enemies of one another. We also sit at a very unique moment in history when we have just had the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty in which the nuclear weapon states made an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
On this harrowing backdrop, and on this note of opportunity, I would like to introduce our speakers this morning. The first will be Ambassador Norman Wulf, who serves as the Special Representative of the President of the United States for Nuclear Non Proliferation. He was the United States Representative to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and led the delegation at the recent review conference. Prior to this current position he served for 14 years as Deputy Assistant Director for Non Proliferation and Regional Arms Control of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Before that Mr. Wulf was an office director in the Department of State handling the Law of the Sea and marine science issues. In other words, he comes with a long history of dealing with international security issues and treaties. I have the privilege now of asking Ambassador Wulf to begin.
AMBASSADOR NORMAN WULF: Thank you very much, Jonathan, and thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for coming this morning. I think if I were to summarize my speech at the beginning, rather than at the end, which is traditional, I would probably have to quote from the Broadway musical a few years back called Oliver. There was a character in Oliver called Fagan, and one of his more classic songs in that Broadway musical was “Im Reviewing the Situation…” That is fundamentally the essence of my message with respect to the Bush Administrations approach to nuclear arms control. Basically it is all under review, and at this point in time there is not much that can be said definitively. What I will try to do this morning is to walk through quickly the 13 points from the Final Document, which in many ways is a comprehensive list of the steps that can be taken in the area of nuclear disarmament, and see what we can glean, either from campaign statements or from statements made at confirmation hearings, which is basically about the only basis at this point in time in which one can make any guesses. And I think they have to be called guesses, on the policy the Bush Administration will pursue.
Jonathan was mentioning some of the historic firsts, and in some ways, this is a historic first. This is the first time that the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty) produced a Final Document and then the Administration that negotiated that document left office and the Administration of another Party took office. So the question becomes which of the provisions that the Clinton Administration found acceptable is it likely that the Bush Administration will find acceptable. I say that is historic because this happens only once every 20 years that there is a coincidence of these two events, our national elections and a Review Conference. In 1980, the other time in the 31 year history of the NPT that there was such an event, there was no final document. We are in a situation we have not been before.
If you will indulge me, what I would like to try to do is give you at least some inkling as to where the Administration may come out, but I do have to stress that this is my view, and at this point there are virtually no official positions on any of these issues. Having said that, let me quickly go through the issues. I will try to do this in fairly rapid order, because I suspect we want to have adequate time for the questions and answers.
The first two of the practical steps in the Final Document of the NPT Conference focus on CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) ratification and a moratorium on nuclear testing. I lump them together because they are both nuclear testing related. President Bush, as a candidate, made statements indicating that he would not support the CTBT. Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his confirmation hearings, stated that the Administration would not be submitting the CTBT to the Congress for advise and consent for ratification during this term. Left unsaid is whether they will do it during the next term. Also, during the confirmation hearings, both Secretary Powell and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld acknowledged the report that had been submitted just prior to the confirmation hearings by General Shalikashvili and both indicated the Administration would be undertaking a study of the recommendations that General Shalikashvili had made in the report of approaches that could make the CTBT acceptable to the United States.
The third item from the NPT document was the negotiation of a FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty). As you will recall, in 1995 there was no final document from the NPT conference, but the 1995 conference did produce a series of decisions. One of the decisions was “Principles and Objectives for further activities in nuclear disarmament,” and one of the steps envisaged in that document was the negotiation of a FMCT. There has not been such a negotiation. No substantive work has yet been done on the question of a FMCT. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty has as its purpose the stopping of unsafeguarded production of nuclear materials that can be used in nuclear weapons. Those negotiations have not yet occurred, and it is not clear that they will occur. The US position is we are prepared to negotiate such a treaty now with no conditions. Other countries have insisted that there be linkages between the negotiation of an FMCT and the negotiation of nuclear disarmament. Others insist on a linkage between the negotiation of a treaty and negotiation of a treaty on outer space. The position of the Clinton Administration, and my expectation is the position of the Bush Administration, is that the US is opposed to negotiation now on outer space and to multilateral negotiation of nuclear disarmament, but it remains very supportive of the FMCT to stop further production of material that could be used in nuclear weapons.
I was a lawyer at one time in my career, and usually in law school you are taught that ambiguity is the enemy, that you should seek as much clarity as possible. But I have discovered after some 30-odd years working in multilateral negotiations that ambiguity oftentimes is your friend. Indeed, if you dont have ambiguity, you will not reach agreement.
Nothing could further demonstrate that point than the decision in the Final Document that calls for multilateral discussions dealing with nuclear disarmament. The Final Document emphasizes “the necessity of establishing in the Conference an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament.” That is designed to allow countries like the United States, and not just the United States, to support the language because we can interpret “to deal with” as not meaning to negotiate. And “an appropriate subsidiary body” allows us to say that such a subsidiary body would not be a negotiating body. Equally true for those who seek such a negotiation, “an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament” allows them to say that an appropriate subsidiary body is a negotiating body, and “to deal with” means to negotiate. The ambiguity is there, it is purposeful, and I think that rather than approaching the language in the Final Document as a legal document to be parsed, one is much better off approaching it as an indication of the general direction in which the international community, as represented at the NPT Review Conference, seeks progress toward nuclear disarmament.
The fifth measure is on irreversibility. Obviously in the area of nuclear arms control if you can readily reverse a measure to reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons, and reacquire those weapons, or additional materials for weapons, you are not really making real progress towards disarmament because it can be readily reversed. One of the goals of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) would be to ensure that you could not produce additional materials.
Another objective in which the US and Russia are engaged is to take the surplus supplies of material that is useable in nuclear weapons and change it to such a form that it can no longer be used for weapons purposes. One illustration: The United States is purchasing 500 tons of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Russia is first down-blending that highly enriched uranium to a level of enrichment in the neighborhood of 3 to 5 percent. That is the level which we would call low enriched uranium, a level that is usually utilized as fuel for nuclear power reactors. The down-blending of this material is taking place under the supervision and inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency. So 500 tons of this material is being irreversibly taken out of the Russian inventory.
The United States in addition is presently engaged in a similar activity where we are down-blending some 54 tons of Highly Enriched Uranium under IAEA supervision. This also will be put into the nuclear power program, as opposed to the nuclear weapons program.
The sixth item is the one that I think Jonathan referred to in his opening introduction, the so-called “unequivocal commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.” This language, I suspect, amongst all the items in the Final Document, perhaps was the most intensely negotiated, and not because there is any disagreement that when Article VI of the NPT uses the term, nuclear disarmament, that we disagreed as to whether nuclear disarmament means zero or not. It does mean zero. The real question became were there any qualifications attached to the unequivocal commitment to eliminate all nuclear weapons. In the United States there is a condition attached to it, that is the condition that it is related to Article 6. It is the US governments position that the unequivocal commitment set forth in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference is a restatement of Article 6 in the Treaty. But, as the Ambassador of Mexico said in his concluding statement, it makes explicit that which had always been implicit, and therefore is a significant step forward.
Provision Seven calls for early entry into force of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START II, and quickly moving to START III negotiations between the United States and Russia and the preservation of the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty. On this one let me take a little time to try to set forth where I think things may be going. This is the area in which the most intense review is presently going on in Washington. The outcome will not be known until some time in the late spring or early summer. Obviously what that outcome will be I dont think any of us can predict.
With respect to further reductions, candidate Bush, and subsequently, as President Bush, has said that he seeks the lowest possible numbers consistent with international security. He has indicated during the campaign that he believed that those numbers could be significantly less than what was contemplated for the START III negotiations. For those who are not familiar with the numbers from START III, what that contemplated was in the area of 2,000 nuclear weapons being retained by both sides. President Bush has indicated, subject to the study, that he would favor going below that number of 2,000, how far below remains to be seen. He has also indicated some impatience with the present process of lengthy negotiations with the Russians to try to come up with these new numbers and has suggested that perhaps a better model might be to take a unilateral step, where the United States unilaterally reduces down to a lower number, and then seeks to have Russia take a similar step.
This in large part is based upon an action, I think, that his father took in 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. At that time then Presidents Bush and Gorbachev agreed to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons, or sub-strategic nuclear weapons, back onto their national territory. This had the effect, in the case of Russia, of removing tactical nuclear weapons from what were to become shortly the newly independent states. This was done unilaterally. I would call these parallel unilateral actions. In some ways formal arms control has become a very complicated process because Congress, through a number of pieces of legislation, has sought to place extremely severe restrictions on the ability of the Administration to take certain measures. But those did not extend so far as to prevent parallel unilateral actions. I personally believe that President Bush thinks that you can continue to do parallel unilateral actions in the field of strategic systems, as well as with sub-strategic.
The other issue mentioned is the ABM Treaty. As I have said, the key to reaching agreement in the 2000 NPT Review was preserving ambiguity. The language of the Final Document says “while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.” Preserving is something that the Clinton Administration believed in, but they also believed in and sought to strengthen it through amending it. Russia, on the other hand, believes that its strategic stability depends upon preserving the ABM Treaty and they interpret the word strengthen to mean amendments that were adopted in 1996 that would make modest changes in the ABM Treaty to allow some testing of theater missile defenses. Clearly this is a difference of view papered over by this language.
The Administration has made clear that they will seek to deploy missile defenses as soon as it is practically feasible. Indeed I would note that it is a matter of law. Congress passed legislation that said it is the policy of the United States to deploy missile defenses as soon as it is technologically feasible. The Clinton Administration, I think, would have gone ahead with a deployment decision had the tests of the ABM systems gone well, but they didnt go well and therefore they delayed the decision for this Administration. This Administration is presently reviewing the situation and the results of that review are not in. But I think that as soon as there is a technically feasible system, and what that system will be remains an open question, there will be a decision to go ahead with deployment, preferably, and the President has made this clear, after extensive consultations with friends, allies, and with Russia and China.
The next of the thirteen steps is the trilateral initiative, an initiative between the United States and Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that would call for the IAEA to verify the elimination of these surplus nuclear stocks. In addition to HEU, another material that could be used is separated plutonium. What the trilateral initiative would address is what verification arrangements would apply to the excess separated plutonium. Right now the United States and Russia have both committed themselves to dispose of 54 tons of separated plutonium. Unlike HEU you cant just blend it down and burn it in a nuclear power reactor. You can, however, do one of two things, and this is what the two parties had agreed that they would do. One option is to take the highly enriched plutonium and mix it with uranium, making what is called a Mixed Oxide fuel or MOX. This MOX can then also be burnt in power reactors, and in fact this is taking place now in Japan, France, Switzerland and a couple of other countries.
The other alternative is to take the plutonium and blend it down with trash so that essentially it is as difficult to separate that plutonium back out from that trash substance as it was to separate the plutonium in the first place. It is not clear what option the United States would pursue when this can be firmed up. It is clear that Russia wishes to go the mixed oxide route. It is clear that would also cost several billions of dollars, and it is clear that the United States will not pay all those costs alone. We are committed thus far to 200 million dollars to that effort. We are seeking commitments from other countries, particularly in Europe and Japan, for the additional funds. It is not clear that additional funds will be forthcoming.
The ninth element called for unilateral steps. It calls for increased transparency. There are clearly more areas where the United States could be more transparent, but among the other nuclear weapon states there are some that have not provided much information, or perhaps no information, with respect to their nuclear arsenals. This is a plea for greater transparency. It also asks for further reductions in the non-strategic nuclear weapons. This in part, I think, is the result of the US and Russian initiatives from the 1991 time frame. The United States has eliminated about 80% of its total inventory of non-strategic systems. Of the other 20%, some remain deployed in Europe, but most of them are back here in the United States awaiting destruction.
Concrete measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons. As you know, all bombers in the US fleet have been de-alerted. All systems in Europe, all nuclear weapons that the United States had deployed in NATO, have been withdrawn, except for gravity bombs. The aircraft to deliver them have been reduced in number and the alert status of those aircraft is better calculated in weeks and days than in minutes and hours, as during the Cold War. This again is an area in which President Bush, in the campaign, said that he wanted to see more progress made in reducing further the alert status of our weapons. That is a key part of the ongoing review.
A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies is also part of the review. Lastly, because specific measures are aimed at the United States and Russia, there is an engagement by all nuclear weapon states in the process of further reduction that primarily is aimed at the other three nuclear weapon states. I think that covers the major elements of the Final Document. Let me stress again that we really dont know where this Administration will come out. We should know before the end of the summer. Thank you very much.
JONATHAN GRANOFF: Thank you, Ambassador Wulf. Of course the future is always ambiguous, and that puts a greater responsibility on those of us who want to influence the future. 97% of the nuclear weapons in the world are in the hands of two countries, the United States and Russia. I now have the privilege of introducing Victor Vasiliev, who is the Political Counsellor of the Russian Mission to the UN specifically covering disarmament and other international security issues. He was a member of the Russian delegation to the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT and the 2000 Review Conference. He was also a member of the Russian delegation to the PrepComs of the respective conferences.
VICTOR VASILIEV: For us to understand what happened at the 2000 NPT Review Conference we need to review the atmosphere under which the Conference took place. I believe that the end of the twentieth century was characterized by dramatic achievements in nuclear disarmament, but unlike the seventies, when the former Soviet Union and the United States were engaged in talks on the limitation of nuclear arms, at the end of the nineties Russia and the United States were engaged in a more substantial process, the reduction and elimination of certain types of nuclear weapons. As you all know, in December, 1994 the START I Treaty, the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, came into force. Under this treaty, up until now, more than one thousand intercontinental ballistic missiles were eliminated and more than 30 strategic submarines and 30 heavy bombers have been dismantled by Russia. In total, under this START I Treaty, 40% of the Russian strategic nuclear forces will be reduced by December of this year. One must not forget the economic dimension of this process, because it requires a lot of energy and resources. As you know, Russia is in a transition period and sometimes it is very difficult to find the resources for the destruction process. As you are all aware, many people were involved in the military industry, and it is difficult to find new jobs and new spheres for those who for decades were involved in military production. We are talking about hundreds of thousands of people.
In January 1993 another important treaty, START II, was signed by the Russian Federation and the United States, which provided for even higher reductions of the Russian and American nuclear arsenals to the level of 3,500 nuclear weapons each. What is important about the START II Treaty is that it also provided for the total elimination of intercontinental missiles with Multiple Independently targeted Re-entry Vehicles. Last spring the Russian Federation ratified this very important and crucial treaty while the United States unfortunately, as of now, has not ratified this treaty. In March of 1997 the Presidents of the Russian Federation and of the United States agreed to go ahead with the process of nuclear arms reductions. They agreed on the framework of the START III process. They agreed that the nuclear potential would be reduced to the level of 2500 nuclear warheads, a dramatic reduction. Those were the bilateral efforts by the US and the Russian Federation before the NPT Conference.
There was also a multilateral process going on, with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the indefinite extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty and some other important events. These achievements determined the atmosphere under which we entered into the process of reviewing the NPT Treaty in the year 2000. I think it is not a coincidence that at that time, rather, a little prior to that time, a new initiative in nuclear disarmament emerged. I am not going to “eat the bread,” as we say it in Russian, of my Mexican colleague who will be talking of the New Agenda Coalition, but this is a good example of how the process of nuclear reduction can pave a way for a pragmatic approach to nuclear disarmament. If in the past we were speaking about two approaches, one by the nuclear weapon states, and another by the non nuclear weapon states, which were totally different,. now we have a new environment, a positive environment, I would say. We, of course, together with Ambassador Wulf, may argue with some of the elements of the New Agenda Coalition, but the very idea of a positive approach, aimed at breaching the gap between the nuclear countries and the non- nuclear countries, is a good example and it shows that we are moving in the right direction.
Ambassador Wulf has already mentioned the main outline of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Conference. All of us speaking this morning, and some of you in the hall, were present the dramatic night when agreement was reached. We have a lot of stories to tell about how many sandwiches were eaten, how many cans of soda were drunk, including bottles of whisky, even, in anticipation of the outcome of the telephone conversations with major capitals to find a solution to some dramatic questions. Ambassador Wulf has mentioned many provisions of the NPT Final Document. I just want to direct your attention to one area which was not covered in his presentation, which was the question of the Middle East. This issue was also a major problem in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
I think we are all aware that the nuclear process didnt stop with the conclusion of the Final Document. After the 2000 Review Conference the Presidents of Russia and the United States met three times and each time they discussed strategic issues and came up with new initiatives. President Putin made a proposal to cut missiles down to the figure of 1500 and he said during the Millennium Summit, this is not the limit. Russia could agree on a smaller number of nuclear missiles. In addressing the Millennium Summit President Putin proposed an initiative on an energy supply for the sustained development of mankind, a radical solution of the problems posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and global environmental improvement. Behind this initiative with a long and technically complicated title is an idea to phase out plutonium and greatly reduce the threat that it will be used in the military sphere.
Russia is still fully committed to the obligations undertaken at the NPT Review Conference. I would like to finish by singing as Ambassador Wulf began, but unfortunately I am not a good singer. I dont know whether it is a Russian bear or an American bear who stepped on my ear. I will just echo his tune that we are “in the process of reviewing the situation.” Unfortunately we are not in a position to say where this review will lead us.
One issue is the ABM Treaty. This treaty was negotiated and concluded with the objective not to deploy a missile defense of the territory of the countries and not to provide a base for such a defense. It is clearly stated in Article 1 of the Treaty. If this article is revised, or “strengthened,” whatever words are used, it means we will no longer have an ABM Treaty. But it is not just a phrase that the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability. It really is a prerequisite to the arms reduction treaties I referred to at the beginning, START I, II and III. When the Russian Duma, or parliament, ratified START II, the Duma made a specific reference to the preservation of the ABM Treaty. If the ABM Treaty is ruined it may lead to, I wouldnt say a continuation of the arms race, but to what Ambassador Wulf said, reviewing the situation. I hope that this review will be a positive one. This afternoon, the depositories of the NPT will be going to visit Ambassador Baali and some people in the Secretariat to start a new review process in preparation for the 2005 NPT Conference. And I hope that the next conference will be also a positive one and will also conclude with a final document. Thank you so much.
JONATHAN GRANOFF: For many of us who are not part of the process, the documents have importance, but what is more important is to see the fulfillment of the promise of the documents. Often it is only your best friend who can tell you that your tie and your suit clash. Some of us have noticed dramatic inconsistencies between the maintenance of nuclear systems by Russia and the United States on hair trigger alert as they were at the height of the Cold War, the promises contained within the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and the continued centrality of nuclear weapons in both countries strategic policies. I now have the privilege of introducing Minister Maria Angelica Arce de Jeannet who has been a member of the Mexican Foreign Service since 1981. She has worked in Geneva and Stockholm, and has held a variety of positions within the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Mexico with a particular emphasis on disarmament issues. She has been addressing these issues in New York since 1996. It is fitting, when Mexico has a new dynamic, creative President, and Mexico has shown extraordinary leadership on these issues, to introduce Angelica Arce.
MARIA ANGELICA ARCE DE JEANNET: Thank you very much for the invitation to participate in this round table. First, let me give you some information regarding the 2000 Conference of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It has been underlined this morning by my two colleagues that the core topic was the negotiation of the nuclear disarmament article. But the Treaty has several provisions dealing with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with nuclear-weapon-free zones, and with the activities carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna regarding the safeguards agreements concluded by the IAEA with countries. So the Final Document adopted last year at the NPT Conference covers the full range of topics included in the Treaty. The question to be answered this morning is how can the commitments made at the Non Proliferation 2000 Review Conference be fulfilled.
Before answering this question I would like to emphasize that the successful outcome of the Conference was due to the flexibility and political will shown by all States Parties of the Treaty, in particular, by the five nuclear weapon states and the New Agenda Initiative. The New Agenda Initiative States are Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and South Africa, countries that renounced the option of developing a nuclear weapon program. On 9 June 1998 the Foreign Affairs Ministers of these seven countries adopted a joint declaration entitled “Towards a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda.” They stated that those seven countries could no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear weapon states, and the three nuclear weapons capable states, India, Pakistan and Israel, to make a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and their nuclear weapon capability. The seven Ministers also expressed that the international community should not enter the third millennium with the prospect that the maintenance of nuclear weapons could be considered legitimate for the indefinite future. For those reasons the 2000 NPT Review Conference provided an excellent opportunity to make progress in the field of nuclear disarmament.
The New Agenda Group, coordinated by Mexico at the Conference, presented a working document on nuclear disarmament with proposals to be included in the final outcome of the conference. We engaged in a long negotiating process with the five nuclear weapon states and other nations. Several proposals of the New Agenda were accepted. The most important of them, no doubt, is the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States Parties are committed under Article 6 of the Non Proliferation Treaty. I must say that this wording is not the original proposal presented by the New Agenda, but as in any negotiation, this is a compromise language. Our original proposal was more ambitious.
Posted by zack_allen at 01:36 PM
Disarmament and Arms Control Objectives PART II
The Program of Action on Nuclear Disarmament adopted by consensus at the Sixth Review Conference of the NPT contains thirteen practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article 6 of the Treaty. Ambassador Wulf and Victor already referred to some of the thirteen steps. If you would like to have more precise information on those thirteen steps I invite you to get a postcard published by NGOs supporting nuclear disarmament. This postcard contains the thirteen steps. The steps are a combination of proposals presented by the New Agenda, proposals presented by the five nuclear weapon states, and proposals presented by other delegations. As I mentioned, this is a compromise. The original proposals were more ambitious in some cases. In the end we managed to agree on these thirteen steps. Of course, the next review conference to be held in 2005 will review the implementation of the thirteen steps agreed last year.
Mexico believes that the commitments made at the 2000 conference could be fulfilled through, inter alia, the following concrete actions. All these actions are related to the thirteen practical steps.
First of all, the second conference on ways and means to facilitate the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will be held in New York next September, from 25-27 September, and chaired by Mexico, probably by the Foreign Affairs Minister. This Conference should provide a framework for the early entry into force of this treaty.
Second, the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) of ad hoc committees on nuclear disarmament and fissile material. So far it has not been possible to establish these two committees, as well as other committees because there is no agreement on the program of work in the CD. The main reason there is no agreement is because of the political positions taken by the United States, China and the Russian Federation regarding the preservation of the ABM treaty and the possibility of developing a national missile defense. This is what has obstructed an agreement in the CD. And the CD is the only negotiating body for disarmament. The CTBT was negotiated by the CD and once this review of US policy is completed we hope intensive consultations among the key governments could help the CD to start its work.
Another concrete action should be the continuation of the START process through additional bilateral reductions of nuclear weapons to be agreed by the US and the Russian Federation.
A fourth action could be unilateral and bilateral initiatives by the five nuclear weapon states in accordance with the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. So far there have been bilateral agreements reached between the US and the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom is an example of the unilateral reduction of some of its nuclear weapons. Of course at the same time they have modernized the existing ones. The position of the New Agenda Group is that France, the United Kingdom and China should join the US and the Russian Federation in the process of global nuclear disarmament.
A fifth action could be the observance of the principle of the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament measures. Ambassador Wulf has already mentioned this. And finally, the conclusion of arrangements by all nuclear weapon states to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA verification to ensure that fissile material will not be used again for the production of nuclear weapons.
After the 2000 NPT Conference the New Agenda group presented a resolution in the First Committee of the General Assembly last October. That resolution was adopted by 153 votes in favor, 3 votes against, mainly the three states that are not parties to the NPT (India, Pakistan and Israel) and 8 abstentions. The resolution reflected to a great extent the substantive outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, mainly the 13 steps contained in the Program of Action. The broad support for the resolution underlined the need for action to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons with the participation of all member states.
I would like to mention that the New Agenda Group presented a resolution for the first time in 1998. It was also adopted by a large majority, but with a good number of abstentions and votes against, and the same happened in 1999. But in 2000, after the successful outcome of the NPT Conference, the resolution only got 3 votes against, and 8 abstentions. Right now the New Agenda Group is in the process of consulting because this year we will again present a resolution for the consideration of the General Assembly. We hope that the broad support expressed last year will be continued again this year. Thank you.
JONATHAN GRANOFF: Thank you very much. I believe the NGO that produced the post card with the 13 steps is WILPF, the Womens International League for Peace and Freedom, and their web site is www.reachingcriticalwill.org. The postcard would be available through them. I would now like to open the floor for some questions and comments. Do any of the panelists have any comments?
AMBASSADOR WULF: I would just like to pick up on a comment that Angelica made that there is more to the Final Document than just the 13 steps. And it is important to underscore that, because there is a tendency to focus on Article 6, and ignore the rest of the NPT. I think it is clear to all that nuclear disarmament cannot succeed if nuclear non-proliferation fails. It is very important that the totality of the NPT continues to be observed. This means that nuclear weapon states, such as the United States and Russia, have a continuing obligation to provide assistance to non-nuclear states through Article 4, not necessarily in terms of providing nuclear power plants. There are certainly many peaceful uses of the atom that have absolutely nothing to do with nuclear power. They have to do with nuclear medicine, hydrology, agriculture, etc. Those provisions also have to be observed. And a basic point: when a country, such as Iraq, or North Korea, who are parties to the NPT, violate that treaty, we also have to take those violations seriously. The closer we get to universality, and we are now within four countries of having every country in the world as a party to this treaty, the more important compliance becomes, because a treaty that is not observed obviously is not a treaty that will last over time.
CHARLIE PETERSON, Philadelphia Friends Meeting: I have a question for Ambassador Wulf, and perhaps others. You spoke about the possibility of other nations that may want to have nuclear weapons. What is the kind of enforcement action that is possible?
AMBASSADOR WULF: Enforcement is obviously one of the key issues. In the case of North Korea what happened was the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) detected something was wrong, and asked to do further inspections to clarify what the problem was. North Korea refused to allow it and the IAEA Board of Governors then referred the issue to the Security Council. The Security Council urged North Korea to comply, and all states to work with North Korea to see if there could not be a resolution. That in turn led to the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea.
In the case of Iraq, the violation only became known once the inspectors went into Iraq following the Gulf War. While there had been evidence to suggest that Iraq might be cheating on its NPT obligations even before the Gulf War, there was no proof. When the inspectors went in following the Gulf War, the proof was clearly there and the Security Council, in Resolution 707, found Iraq to be in violation and urged them to comply. But since there was already an enforcement mechanism in place with respect to Iraq, based on the overarching resolution after the Gulf War, that was viewed as adequate to address that malfeasance by Iraq.
There are no other cases in which a country has been found to have violated the NPT, although there are clearly countries whose activity, for instance their purchases, seem inconsistent with the peaceful program. The US works actively with other supplier countries to ensure that no one supplies equipment to those countries if that would lead them to have a nuclear weapons capability. But there is no short easy answer. The NPT, unlike the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) does not have enforcement mechanisms written into it. Clearly what was contemplated, and certainly what has taken place, is that the enforcement has been taken via the UN Security Council.
ED AGUILAR, Philadelphia LAWS and Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities: I want to follow up on what Ambassador Wulf mentioned the Korean Agreed Framework. For several years there have been negotiations between the two Koreas and the United States and I believe China has been helpful at various times. Pursuant to the Framework agreement, there seems to have been quite a bit of progress made last year, but this year these negotiations have been stopped with no current plan to resume. Could you comment on that, and on what can be done to pursue the Agreed Framework?
AMBASSADOR WULF: As far as the Bush Administration is concerned, we are back to the refrain, I am reviewing the situation. But Secretary Powell has made clear that the United States will observe the Agreed Framework and we will try to take actions to further the objectives of the agreed framework. How that will take place is still being examined. We will be meeting with South Korea and Japan. This is a three way effort joined in by other countries as well. The European Union makes a significant contribution, Australia and several other countries as well. But the three big players, in terms of money and politics, are South Korea, Japan and the US.
I do not know how it is going to unfold. Certainly there were some promises made by the North Korean government to the previous Administration in the area of missile transfers. There is concern whether all those provisions are being met, and verification of that. With respect to the Agreed Framework itself, the IAEA is maintaining a continuous presence at the North Korean nuclear facility. The construction of the light water reactors, a portion of the Agreed Framework, has gone very slowly indeed. Rounding up the money, arranging the financing and working through all the political problems has taken a lot longer than either side expected. So it is behind schedule, but it is going forward. My own personal expectation, but obviously I cannot speak for the Administration, is that we will continue to implement the agreed framework with the normal ups and downs that we experienced during the Clinton Administration. I expect we will continue to have those during the Bush Administration as well.
WILFRED GREY, UNA-UK: What factors most influenced the thinking behind the “unequivocal elimination of nuclear weapons?” The increasing number of generals who are saying that strategically and tactically the use of nuclear weapons is absurd? The World Court ruling? The fear that the NPT would unravel if they did not make the commitment? Revulsion against the use of nuclear weapons?
AMBASSADOR WULF: You ask a good question. I am not sure I have a good answer for you. I cannot get into the heads of the decision-makers who made the decision. I worked very closely with the Pentagon prior to the NPT to get the authority for us to engage in the negotiation as we did. None of the factors that you mentioned were the key factor. I would think the key factor is and remains the international security environment. Let me underscore that by reading a quotation from Colin Powell at his confirmation hearing. He was asked a question about Senator Cranstons views with respect to nuclear disarmament.
Secretary Powell said “his dedication to a world without nuclear weapons was known to all of us. And even though we disagreed on how to get there and what the world required right now, we both had the same goal in mind, and that was at some point in the future we should see a world where there were no nuclear weapons, there was no need for any, there was no need for missile defense, there was no need for strategic offensive forces, that mankind had moved beyond that. I hope that day is reached in our lifetime, but until then I also think that we have to remain strong and guard our interests.”
I cite that quote particularly because of the last sentence, because I think that summarizes at least how Colin Powell looks at the issue, and I would daresay how the Pentagon looks at the issues. The strategic environment has to allow for reductions in the weapons to the point that you suggest.
Clearly if one takes the premise, and I think that premise is probably supportable, that the United States has superiority in conventional weaponry, one would think a world without nuclear weapons would be a world in which the United States would remain in a key position. Therefore one could clearly argue that we could see a situation in which the United States would favor a world without nuclear weapons.
My own view is that one of the key components of a world without nuclear weapons is the verification component. I guess one can concede the situation in which cheating on a Chemical Weapons Convention, for example, would not be considered strategically ruinous, but I am not sure you could reach the same conclusion on a nuclear abolition treaty. How many weapons, one, two, three, before you really had a strategically unstable situation? My own personal view is that concern about cheating that makes it difficult for me to see how we can get totally to zero. I am not saying we should not continue working toward that goal, but I do think, for me at least, that makes it very difficult to see how you are going to get there any time soon.
VICTOR VASILIEV: In my lifetime I have happened to live in two countries, and to work in two foreign ministries. One was the Soviet Union and another one is Russia. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union we maintained a policy of general and complete nuclear disarmament. In practice, while propagating this idea of nuclear disarmament, as you are aware, the Soviet Union was building up its nuclear arsenal in thousands.
Now Russia maintains a different position, which is criticized by some countries and some people. It is close to that of the United States and other western nuclear states and is known as nuclear deterrence. But under this strategy we moved to a much greater reduction from very high ceilings to a lower level. I think from the pragmatic point of view the second trend is more favorable than the first one. Sometimes it is better to do something than to say it. We live in a very complicated world, and of course I would like to be a very good friend with Ambassador Wulf and with all of you here in this hall, but when you open the front page of the NY Times you see so many other stories, unfriendly in nature I should say. That is why we have to take into consideration all factors when we approach the issue of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.
Coming to your question of unequivocal commitment. I dont think that Russia or the United States or any other nuclear country rejected this approach. We still maintain, yes, we are for the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the final goal and as a part of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Ambassador Wulf in his previous presentation mentioned that we should approach the 2000 Review document as a complex document which has various factors. He also mentioned this is a balance and I agree with him. The unequivocal commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons is part of this comprehensive approach. As far as Russia is concerned we are trying to fulfill our obligations leading to this goal. While achieving this goal we are taking a step-by-step approach.
You referred to the ruling of the International Court of Justice. I dont think it is up to the Court to decide at what time and how nuclear weapons should be eliminated. It is a broader process which involves many factors. What is good and what is positive is that we are striving towards this goal.
MARIA ANGELICA ARCE DE JEANNET: I think that many of the States Parties of the NPT have shown flexibility and political will at the 2000 Review Conference because we were aware that we could not afford a failure once again. After the addition of two nuclear weapon states, India and Pakistan, it was very clear that the international regime established by the NPT was jeopardized by the nuclear tests conducted by these two Asian countries. There was an obligation to engage in very serious negotiations and to reach an agreement. It is true that the 13 steps are not the only part of the Final Document, but it is the primary goal of the Final Document. The New Agenda Group pursued in the negotiations the inclusion of this unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states. As it was mentioned, it is an explicit commitment, because we already had the same commitment contained in the wording of Article VI.
It was not easy to reach this agreement, because the 13 steps are a package. All the 13 steps are very closely interrelated. The approval of the five nuclear weapon states to the unequivocal undertaking was obtained only after they got some language in the 13 steps. For one nuclear weapon state it was extremely important to have a linkage with general and complete disarmament. That means that in the process of disarmament we should have not only nuclear disarmament but also conventional disarmament. For another nuclear weapon state it was very important to have a reference to strategic stability. We have different language. We have the principle of undiminished security for all. Another nuclear weapon state was not in a position to accept a time frame for this unequivocal undertaking. But as a representative of one of the non nuclear weapon states who participated very actively in the negotiations, I want to stress that the five nuclear weapon states showed enough flexibility to conclude this agreement, and this must be recognized by all States Parties, because we could have had the same situation that we had in 1995, in 1990 and in 1985 where we couldnt agree on a final substantive document. Last year we really got that Final Document.
Now the challenge is how to implement those commitments. We should recognize that the international situation right now is not the best to allow some of the nuclear weapon states to proceed with concrete actions. Nevertheless, the non nuclear weapon states have an obligation to continue pushing for these additional concrete steps in the field of nuclear disarmament.
JONATHAN GRANOFF: I noted that Secretary Powell referred to Senator Cranston, who was my mentor in this subject. I am his successor as the President of the Global Security Institute. I would like to express public appreciation for his clarity and years of leadership and inspiration. The key difference between his perspective and Secretary Powells goes to the issue of interests, guarding our interests. Senator Cranston defined our interests in three capacities. One was morality. He felt very strongly that the continued threat to use nuclear weapons on hundreds of millions of innocent people as a means of obtaining security was intrinsically unworthy of civilization. That was the term that he used. He also expressed the issue of stability. He thought that the continued reliance of very strong states on nuclear weapons for their security would be a stimulant for other states to try and develop nuclear arsenals. He argued that the interest being guarded included stability, and that the elimination of nuclear weapons would increase stability.
The third was one of moral coherence, and consistency. If one state is going to say to other states, you should not have them, that state should also move to eliminate them. So those were the interests that he articulated in distinction to Secretary Powells interests. I have not heard clearly articulated by Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China or the United States what the prevailing national interests are that justify the continued reliance on nuclear weapons. We are not ideological or practical enemies any longer. I just dont think anybody really believes that the United States has some aspiration to take over Russia or that Russia has imperial ambitions to take over and threaten the United States any longer. So what are the Russian interests presently that are so overriding that necessitate reliance on nuclear weapons? And Ambassador Wulf, what are the interests presently of the United States that are so pressing that we need to keep nuclear weapons? What are the present arguments to keep these weapons that we have to overcome?
VICTOR VASILIEV: I am not a Chinese diplomat to raise this issue but for a couple of weeks we eye-witnessed a huge crisis with regard to the spy aircraft. With all its complexities the US and China are living through this crisis. Yes, there are some in the US and in China who would like to make sharp remarks. But all those people, especially those who are in power, realize quite well that we are dealing with superpowers. Like it or not, nuclear weapons are a kind of a symbol of a superpower which helps to resolve very difficult questions in a responsible manner.
As far as Russia is concerned, of course we have our own national interests, as the United States and other countries have. To give you a few examples, if we speak about the United States and its neighbors we are speaking about Canada and Mexico, a nice warm environment, surrounded by the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. With Russia it is a bit different. When you look at the map you see a number of conflict spots along our border. We try to maintain friendly relations with all our neighbors. But we have to be realistic and we need to secure our borders.
Another problem is the question of NATO. We may confront in the very near future the expansion of NATO very close to the border of Russia. Both strategic nuclear and tactical nuclear weapons are located in Europe. Military doctrine adopted by the US military can allow some tactical nuclear weapons for aircraft to be used by German pilots, so we may confront not only direct threats but also a nuclear sharing threat as well.
Taking this into consideration, we still need to rely on nuclear arsenals. But as I said we are willing to go ahead with our nuclear reductions and to negotiate further arms reduction treaties with the United States and with our European partners.
AMBASSADOR NORMAN WULF: I am glad I come second; it is easier, in some ways. It is of course true that the relationship between the United States and Russia now is fundamentally different than the relationship that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. The areas of cooperation are extensive. The United States has spent by this point over $6 billion in Russia seeking to secure its nuclear program so that it can assure that it does not leak out the back door to proliferators. There is unheard of cooperation in areas such as safe storage of their nuclear warheads. We are building a huge complex at Mayak with US taxpayers dollars that is devoted to ensuring that the plutonium I talked about earlier, does not revert back to weapons use during the years that it will take to have that converted into totally benign materials. The plutonium will go into this facility, once it is complete, and the IAEA will ensure that it never comes out except for conversion into MOX fuel. There are other examples I could cite.
The same is true with respect to China, a relationship that continues to evolve. When I was driving to the airport this morning, the words were very encouraging about what was going to happen to the crew of this plane, that they were going to be released. One does not have to have a long memory to recall the vast changes that have occurred in the nature of our relationship with China. It is fundamentally different from what it was even five years ago, let alone ten. I can remember the first visit I made to China was in 1984, and the Embassy took me to two spots where there were private enterprise stalls, as they were called then. Now they are everywhere. The state stores are facades. It is the private enterprise stalls that are running that system. There was one decent hotel in Beijing in 1984. Now you can find any number. These are only small indications of some of the fundamental changes that are taking place. Other changes, obviously, are the information technology that is available. I could go on at some length.
I have no disagreement with the premise of the question put to me. There has been a fundamental change. But there is a reality that our Russian colleague just underscored, and that is that there still are nuclear weapons in Russia, there are still nuclear weapons in China, and neither, I believe, is prepared to give them up, even if the Untied States is prepared to give them up. Then the question becomes, should those weapons be retained by the United States as an insurance of deterrence? That is certainly my assumption as to why the United States continues to possess nuclear weapons. I underscore, my assumption. Again, I will revert back to what I said earlier. This is part of the review that is taking place in Washington. I refer all of you to the campaign statement made by candidate Bush on May 20 of last year in which he goes through a fairly lengthy discussion on the role of nuclear weapons. But the fundamental thrust of that statement was to say that we really need to take a hard look, not whether, but how many we need, and for what purposes. And that is exactly what is going on in Washington now.
JOHN REMPEL, Mennonite Central Committee: A question for Mr. Vasiliev with regard to the comments that Ambassador Wulf made earlier regarding START III and the US use of parallel reduction as a negotiating mechanism. I am wondering how Russia views that.
VICTOR VASILIEV: It is obvious two powers posses the most nuclear warheads. It is all but natural that those two powers engage in negotiations. Russia maintains that the best way to address the issue is first through bilateral negotiations, and we hope that other nuclear powers, as Angelica said, will join those negotiations. At the same time we also understand that some of the steps in nuclear disarmament we can take unilaterally. We only ratified START II in April last year. Before that date we were taking certain steps to reduce our arsenals according to the limits of the START II agreement. After the agreements with the US to go ahead with START III, Russia is already preparing to go ahead with further reductions of our nuclear arsenal. What is also important, once again, is the environment. We have to look at the American policy vis a vis arsenals. What is worrisome is that the American Administration made it rather clear that Russia is no longer a priority for US policy. I dont know how nuclear talks will go if Russia is not a priority. With whom would the new Administration conduct negotiations? So that is why we have to take all those factors, seriously consider them, and after evaluation we can establish our policy, be it unilateral or, as I hope, a continuation of a bilateral process in this field. I do not know if I answered your question entirely.
ERYL COURT, Canada Voice of Women: There is a great deal of opposition to missile defense in Canada. Professor John Polanyi, a Nobel laureate, referred to this system as illusory. Another Nobel laureate, Professor Joseph Rotblat, has pointed out that this system, intended to achieve security, does just the opposite. We now live in a global village. No member of the global village can be safe unless all are safe. …We are involved in a terrible gambling game…we are playing nuclear poker…the force of law must replace force…I would like to see the US leading the world for peace.
AMBASSADOR NORMAN WULF: It is not only in Canada that the question of missile defense is controversial. There is also, I think, a fair amount of controversy in the United States, and probably a fair amount of opposition. All I can say is that there has been some evolution in the thinking with respect to missile defense between the previous Administration and this Administration. That evolution is even more firm that we will proceed with missile defenses. But the one evolution that I would point to is that this Administration has adopted, as a matter of its policy, that what we are seeking to deploy is a missile defense system that is capable not only of defending the United States but also our friends and allies. That is a departure from where we were before. I dont think that addresses your concern.
Some argue that one cannot be for nuclear disarmament and also for the ABM Treaty. The basic underlying premise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972 when it was negotiated was Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The goal was to ensure that both sides remain subject to total annihilation and that the way to achieve that was to limit the amount of defenses they could put in place so that they would remain vulnerable. Many find that goal incompatible with the post-Cold War situation.
This Administration has said that the purpose of the missile defense system that it is pursuing is not to provide an impenetrable shield that will protect it against retaliation, or a first attack from Russia. Rather, it continues to point to a limited capability against a limited threat. The threat that it points to is the threat from rogue states. The question that arises is, is that an appropriate response to a rogue state threat? Why would any country attack the United States with a nuclear missile when it is clear that, of all forms of attack, that is probably the most easily traced to where it was launched. Wouldnt the United States immediately retaliate? Therefore any country that did this has a death wish. But that presently is the concern. There may be countries that have that approach. We know there are suicide bombers, unfortunately, in the Middle East. It is almost a daily occurrence. We also know that more countries are acquiring missile capabilities. I quickly add that the countries that protest the most strongly against missile defense, Russia and China, are also the countries that have supplied those missiles to rogue states. The question really comes down to, can you deal with a rogue state in the way that you dealt with others, that is to rely on nuclear deterrence?
The Clinton Administration, I believe, said, no, you cant rely on that. The Bush Administration is clearly thinking you cannot rely on that. I think they are also saying you cant use the same concepts to protect against an accidental launch. Right now there is absolutely no defense if a missile were accidentally launched against the United States. And this at least would provide a capability against that kind of attack.
To address mistakes the US and Russia last year reached agreement on two separate approaches to that question. First, that when we launch we would notify each other, in advance, so that there would be no misunderstanding as to what was happening. Secondly, that we would share with each other, and establish in Moscow, an early warning system, so that we would be talking with each other and detecting a launch anywhere in the world. The system is not yet in place, but the agreement is, and they are going forward with the mechanisms to put them in place.
I am not sure that I have a comfortable answer to your question. What I do know is that these are some of the arguments. Any Administration must deal with the fact that President Clinton signed a piece of legislation that commits the United States to deploy missile defenses as soon as it is practically feasible. If the Nobel prize winners that you cite are correct, that it is never going to be feasible, then we are talking about a problem that is theoretical only. On the other hand, if there is a practical system out there – I dont think it has been established that there is – then I suspect we will see that system going forward.
VICTOR VASILIEV: I agree with some of the arguments expressed by Ambassador Wulf. I think there are two basic problems with NMD (National Missile Defense). The first one is whether it is an defensive or offensive program. In my opinion it is offensive in nature because, as I said, the ABM Treaty paved the way for the reduction of nuclear weapons because there was no need to have more if there was no good defense. With possible NMD deployment there is an incentive, not only for Russia, to build up their nuclear arsenal.
Another problem is more important to my mind. The deployment of National Missile Defense provides that some of the components of the system will be in outer space, which means that we are opening a new sphere for the arms race in outer space, in violation of the present agreements and understandings not to use outer space as a field of military confrontation. That is why Russia is strongly opposing this idea. For the second year we introduced in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly which deals with disarmament, with China and Belarus, a resolution to preserve the ABM Treaty. We have an increasing number of countries who are supporting our initiative.
MARIA ANGELICA ARCE DE JEANNET: The preservation of the ABM Treaty is a matter of great concern and importance for many of the states members of the United Nations. We recognize that it has to be dealt with by the two states, the United States and the Russian Federation, but any alteration or modification could have implications for global security. Many member states supported the resolution offered by the Russian Federation, Belarus and China. It is true this resolution also had a good number of abstentions and votes against but it has been adopted by a large majority. We also adopted a resolution presented by Iran that calls for a group of experts on missiles to start consideration in a multilateral body the issue of missiles in all its aspects. We hope that this group will present recommendations to the General Assembly next year on ways and means to address this issue.
DIANE PERLMAN, Psychologists for Social Responsibility: Ambassador Wulf, maybe you got to pick a pocket or two…Many billions of dollars involved. Eisenhower warned us about the military industrial complex. People on the Rumsfeld Commission have a vested interest in the threat from rogue states…Weapons are a symptom of a deeper problem. We are talking about taking something away without replacing it. We must replace war with another method of resolving conflicts…
AMBASSADOR NORMAN WULF: … With regard to the military industrial complex, who am I to argue with President Eisenhower? And what was true in 1960 is probably even more true today. Should we put more money into studying peace? The answer for me is obvious, absolutely yes. It is not my decision to make.
ANN HALLAN LAKHDHIR, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies: Yesterday in the Disarmament Commission the Russian delegate said “Russia regards as possible the creation, as appropriate, of non-strategic, region-wide ABM systems to neutralize and counter missile threats. Such systems would be created on a multilateral, non-block basis with the involvement of all the states concerned. We are also prepared for cooperation in this field with all the interested countries.”
If ballistic missile defense were associated with either the total elimination of all nuclear missiles, or getting down to a very low number, and if it were a multilateral system, I think many of us would feel very differently about it. I have wondered if there has been any discussion, and I think you can go back to President Reagan, who at one point was talking about sharing with the Soviet Union, once he had achieved such a system. Has there been any discussion of multilateral sharing of the sort proposed yesterday in the Disarmament Commission?
Another question: I have hoped for many years that there would be created in the Conference on Disarmament a subcommittee that began studying the verification that would be required to eliminate nuclear weapons. It clearly is essential for any treaty that abolishes nuclear weapons. It certainly would not be approved by any of the present countries that have nuclear weapons if they didnt have a fair amount of confidence that you could verify, maybe not 100%, but at least sufficiently so that everyone would feel more secure than they do right now. I had noted at the NPT Review Conference that the UK had an initiative in this area. I am wondering, whether in Russia, and in the US, there are efforts being made to determine not only on what would be required to verify a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, but beyond that, the kind of verification that would be required in order to have a treaty abolishing nuclear weapons. Would this be seen as helpful by non-nuclear countries, and not just as a delaying tactic?
AMBASSADOR NORMAN WULF: In the statement made by Russia yesterday I think I heard the word non-strategic. Fundamentally, the past definition of strategic has been anything that could be launched from the continental US and hit Russia, and vice versa. Non-strategic was everything else. If that is what Russia is proposing, it probably does not answer the threat the Administration says it is concerned with, which is a threat from countries such as North Korea who could launch, from their territory, a missile that could reach US territory. So I am not sure that it is responsive to the concern that has been articulated.
On sharing with Russia, you are correct, my recollection is the same, that the Reagan Administration, when it was pursuing Star Wars, talked about the prospect of sharing with the Soviet Union. I have heard no such discussion from either the Clinton Administration or the Bush Administration. Finally, on the question of verification, I know of no ongoing studies in the United States government to look at the verification of the total elimination of nuclear weapons with any degree of seriousness. On setting up a negotiating group within the CD, I defer to Angelica.
MARIA ANGELICA ARCE DE JEANNET: Last year at the NPT Conference we agreed on the issue of verification. Verification is the 13th step. We agreed on the further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapon-free world. Once a situation will be presented, all States Parties should consider the format to follow-up with these verification aspects. It is the view of some states parties that first of all we should negotiate and conclude a convention for the abolition of nuclear weapons. An annex to be included in that convention could be perhaps the establishment of an international agency to verify these aspects. But at this stage it is premature. Some governments have started thinking on what could be done. First of all we have to make progress with the further reduction of nuclear weapons.
VICTOR VASILIEV: Thank you for paying attention to Russias initiative to counter missile threats. Russia is ready to cooperate in non-strategic missile defense. The idea of a non-strategic missile defense is first of all to address the concerns that may arise. Ambassador Wulf said that the very acceptance of the idea that such concerns do exist justifies the need to have a NMD. I would like to say that one requisite in discussing the idea is to have an evaluation of possible threats. Do we really face a real threat from countries like Iran and North Korea? Are these threats enough to put at risk the whole system of strategic stability? One answer is no. We can discuss the possibility of creating theater missile defense, or European missile defense, or other defenses. What is important about these proposals is that they not be in violation of the existing arms control agreements. The ideas of those who propose National Missile Defense are in total contradiction of present agreements in arms control.
Non-strategic missile defense proposals are part of a bigger strategy presented by the Russian Federation that also includes a global control system on the non proliferation of missiles and missile technology. In March this year a big conference took place in Moscow which discussed various aspects of this issue. As you all know, we have a Missile Technology Control Regime which is limited to only some countries. At the same time the so-called rogue countries, so-called by some countries, or those who are very vulnerable, are not members of this regime. The Russian idea is to have a system that could satisfy the existing members of the Missile Technology Control regime and attract newcomers, like Iran, North Korea, India and others, to make it a broader regime. This system could be created under the auspices of the United Nations, or independently with a broader context. The meeting in Moscow has resulted in a huge document, more than 100 pages, some of them technical, some political, on how this idea can be implemented. As we speak now, the Russian Federation is hosting another conference in Moscow on the non-militarization of outer space. I believe this conference will give a new impetus to the realization of initiatives aimed at countering missile threats.
JONATHAN GRANOFF: Mikhail Gorbachevs comments on the lessons from Reykjavik were unbelievably prescient. He talked about the opportunity, the unique chance, to really end the arms race and eliminate nuclear weapons And he talked about how progress was being made but how the entire momentum was totally destroyed by the aspiration, as he saw it, to weaponize space. The US Space Commands Vision 20/20 talks about “full spectrum dominance”. It is my hope, as an American citizen, that the people who want to use space for peaceful purposes will persuade the military industrial complex to stop any quest for full spectrum dominance so we can live in a world in which nuclear weapons are eliminated. Thank you for coming, and please keep up the work to create that world in which we are not threatening each other. Thank you.
Transcript made possible by the NGO Committee on Disarmament.
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